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The Farm Lease in Bankruptcy: A
Comprehensive Analysis
Margaret Rosso Grossman *
Thomas G. Fischer**
During the past five years, the financial condition of many farm-
ers has deteriorated markedly. Three principal factors account for
this deterioration: stagnating or even declining land prices; high in-
terest rates; and depressed commodity prices., Stagnating or declin-
ing land prices2 have reduced the value of farmers' equity and pose
special problems for landowners who borrowed extensively to
purchase land at inflated values. Interest expenses have consumed
an increasingly large percentage of farm earnings. In 1978, interest
had absorbed approximately one-fifth of the total farm income re-
maining after all other operating expenses had been subtracted; by
1981 it had absorbed approximately two-fifths.3 Depressed commod-
ity prices during recent years have decreased net cash farm income
from thirty-seven billion dollars in 1979, to an estimated thirty-one
billion in 1982.4
This decline in farm income has created cash-flow problems for
many farmers and has prevented some from meeting their financial
obligations. At the end of the 1982 fiscal year, for example, 24.6% of
all the Farmers Home Administration active farm-program borrow-
ers, a total of 66,470, were behind in their scheduled payments.5
During the same year, a record 8,227 borrowers in Farmers Home
* Assistant Professor, Agricultural Law, Department of Agricultural Economics, Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. B. Mus., 1969, University of Illinois; A.M., 1970, Stan-
ford University; Ph.D., 1977, University of Illinois; J.D., 1979, University of Illinois.
** Research Assistant, 1982-83, Agricultural Law, Department of Agricultural Econom-
ics. A.B., 1978, University of Chicago; J.D., 1983, University of Illinois.
I See FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION, AGRICULTURAL AND CREDIT OUTLOOK '83, at
18 (1983).
2 During the period from February 1981 through April 1982, the average value of farm
real estate per acre in the 48 continental states decreased by 1%. See U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, FARM REAL ESTATE MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 5 (July 9,
1982). In many major agricultural states, however, the decrease was much greater. For ex-
ample, in Illinois the decrease was 9%; in Indiana, 13%; and in Ohio, 15%. Id
3 See FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 20.
4 Id at 19.
5 Id at 24.
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Administration programs went out of business.6 Of these, 1,909 vol-
untarily liquidated their farming operations due to financial difficul-
ties; 6,318 were forced to liquidate under threat of foreclosure.7 Of
those forced to liquidate, 1,245 received discharges in bankruptcy."
The American Bankers' Association 1982 Mid-Year Survey of Farm
Credit Conditions reveals that during the period from June 1981
through June 1982, 2.2% of the farmers in the lending area of the
responding banks went out of business, and 0.75% went through
bankruptcy.9 These statistics indicate that a substantial number of
farmer-borrowers in both government-sponsored and private credit
arrangements have experienced financial exigencies. Moreover, dur-
ing the current period of financial stress, a significant number of
farmers will undergo, or at least consider, bankruptcy. 0
The existence of landlord-tenant relationships will often compli-
cate the resolution of these farmers' financial difficulties once they
enter bankruptcy. According to the 1978 Census of Agriculture, ap-
proximately 40% of the land in farms in the United States is rented."I
In some states, the percentage is even higher. In Illinois, for example,




9 Id at 23.
10 The Bankruptcy Code ("Code") is found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). In June
1982, the United States Supreme Court ruled the current bankruptcy system unconstitu-
tional, because bankruptcy judges hold broad power without adequate protection. Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Although Congress was
to alter bankruptcy law to comport with this ruling, no corrective legislation has yet been
enacted. See generally Krasno, The Bankruptcy Courts - Caught in Limbo?, 67 JUDICATURE 307
(1984); see also Ginsburg, The Proposed Bankrupty Improvements Act: The Creditors Strike Back, 3
N. ILL. U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
The Code provides that a farmer cannot be forced into bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a)
(1982). Section 101(17) defines "farmer" as a person who received more than 80% of his gross
income during the taxable year immediately prior to the taxable year of the bankruptcy
proceeding from a farming operation owned or operated by such person. Under § 101(18),
"'farming operation' includes farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farming, ranching, production
or raising of crops, poultry, or livestock, and production of poultry or livestock products in an
unmanufactured state." However, see Marsh, Farmers' Exemption From Involuntaq
, 
Bankrupty,
15 U.C.C. LJ. 162 (1982), where the author suggests that this exemption, as currently writ-
ten, does not really protect a significant number of farmers, because off-farm income is such
an important component of farm sector economics.
Many farmers facing serious financial difficulties will want to consider bankruptcy. In
some situations, bankruptcy may offer the best means of staying in operation through a
Chapter 11 reorganization or a Chapter 13 adjustment of debts; in others, it offers the most
favorable method of terminating an operation through a Chapter 7 liquidation.
11 See U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, 1978 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, PT. 51, at 124 (1981).
12 Id
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very essence of the landlord-tenant relationship, which is often an
informal, oral arrangement based on mutual trust. In addition, the
bankruptcy of either landlord or tenant raises significant and diffi-
cult legal issues.
Agricultural leases are traditionally divided into three general
categories: the cash lease; the crop-share lease; and the livestock-
share lease.13 The cash lease involves a cash payment (either a speci-
fied sum or an amount determined by formula) for the use of farm-
land. Although possessing some special features characteristic of
farm leases, it does not differ significantly from other commercial
lease transactions.' 4 Under a typical crop-share lease, the landlord
supplies part of the equipment and inputs (seed, fertilizer, and other
chemicals) necessary for the tenant to farm the landlord's land. In
exchange, the landlord receives a share of the crops as rent. The rent
share usually ranges from one-third to one-half, depending on the
contributions of farmer and landlord, and local custom. Under a
typical livestock-share lease, the landlord and tenant each own one-
half of the livestock; they share the cost of farm inputs, and each
typically receives one-half of the livestock and crop income.' 5
In light of the number of farm leases, the various types of leasing
arrangements, and the current prevalence of financial difficulty in
13 Two other types of farm leases are the labor-share lease, under which the farmer usu-
ally only contributes labor and management, and the net-share lease, under which the land-
lord receives a cash rent that is a function of annual yields. See F. REIss, FARM LEASES FOR
ILLINOIS 5, 10 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Cooperative Extension Service,
College of Agriculture Circular 1199, Mar. 1982). These account for only a small percentage
of farm leases and will not be discussed in this article. For example, in Illinois labor-share
and net-share leases account for less than 10% of all farm leases. See id. at 7-12.
Farm leases can be oral or written; they are usually leases for a fixed term or year-to-year
tenancies. Many oral leases can be classified as year-to-year tenancies. In addition, when a
farm tenant remains on the land after a written or oral lease for a fixed term has expired, he
usually becomes a tenant from year to year. See, e.g., Butz v. Butz, 13 Ill. App. 3d 341, 299
N.E.2d 782 (1973); Norvill v. Dambacher, 35 111. App. 2d 212, 182 N.E.2d 337 (1962); see also
2 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 255 (1983). As a general rule,
the provisions in the expired lease then carry over to the tenancy from year to year. See id.
Many states have statutory provisions governing the notice required to terminate a farm
tenancy from year to year. These notice periods generally range from one to four months.
See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-206 (1983) (four months); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2506
(1976) (one month, except for fall-seeded crops planted prior to notice, in which case the lease
does not terminate until August 1 or the last of harvest); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-222 (1981)
(three months).
Farm tenancies from year to year are common because the landowner and the farmer
usually know each other personally and tend to handle their relationship informally; many of
the farm landlord-tenant relationships that bankruptcy courts encounter may be of this type.
14 See general'y, 2 J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 36.4 (1982).
15 See F. REiSS, supra note 13, at 7.
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the agricultural industry, one must wonder how the bankruptcy of a
party to a farm lease-either tenant or landlord 6-affects rights and
obligations under the agreement. In answering this question, bank-
ruptcy courts will be required to determine the rights of both the
landlord and the tenant in crops and livestock, as well as the status of
their relationship. Moreover, the court's determination will fre-
quently depend on the type of farm leasing arrangements involved.
Thus, this article analyzes the legal issues that the bankruptcy of a
party to a farm lease engenders.
Instead of entering crop-share leases, some landowners form em-
ployer-employee relationships in which the farmer-employee receives
a share of the crops as wages. These relationships are known as
"ccropper contracts," and they share some of the characteristics of
farm leases.' 7 Sometimes a landowner and farmer will make an in-
formal oral agreement to farm on shares without stating whether
they intend the arrangement to be a crop-share lease or a cropper
contract. If one of the parties to the agreement subsequently enters
bankruptcy, the impact of bankruptcy on the parties will vary con-
siderably depending on how the court construes the agreement.
Therefore, this article also examines the effect of bankruptcy on crop-
per contracts.
I. Nature of the Relationship
A landowner and a farmer have complete freedom to choose the
type of relationship that will govern their farming operation. Their
contract can create a landlord-tenant relationship, an employer-em-
ployee relationship, a partnership, or ajoint venture.18 The language
of their written agreement will be important in determining which
type of relationship they have created, and the parties should there-
fore draft their agreement carefully. Precise conformance with state
law will ensure that the court interprets the document to create the
type of relationship and corresponding legal results that the parties
16 Some of these landowners will meet the statutory definition of farmer and thus be
excluded from involuntary bankruptcy. See note 10 supra. Others, however, particularly
those who farm part-time or as a hobby, will not meet the § 101(17) requirement that they
receive more than 80% of their gross income from a farming operation that they own or
operate. See, e.g., In re Ballard, 4 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re Beechwood, 42 F.
Supp. 401 (D.NJ. 1942). These individuals can be forced into bankruptcy by their creditors.
17 See 2 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 13, 261[3]; Looney, Legal and Economic
Considerations in Drafing Arkansas Farm Leases, 35 ARK. L. REV. 395 (1981); Note, Cropping
Agreements, 19 U. CIN. L. REv. 121 (1950).
18 United States v. Myra Found., 382 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1967).
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desired, should a bankruptcy or other legal action arise. If the lease
is not drafted artfully, however, or if the parties, following common
farm lease practices, have only entered into an oral agreement, the
relationship may not be interpreted as they had intended.
When a bankruptcy court interprets a farm lease, it will also
look beyond the language of the agreement to state law. 19 Thus, by
giving careful consideration to state law when drafting a lease, the
parties can also assess and exercise some control over the impact of
any future bankruptcy on their contractual relationship.
Among the three most common types of farm leases, 20 the crop-
share lease presents the most significant question of interpretation. A
party to a cash lease will find it difficult to argue that the agreement
creates anything but a landlord-tenant relationship.2 1 In contrast,
when a landowner and a farmer agree to farm on shares, they often
do not clearly determine the nature of their relationship; if one of the
parties later declares bankruptcy, the court is forced to make that
determination.
An ambiguous agreement to farm on shares generally raises one
of two issues, depending on the jurisdiction and the nature of the
agreement. Usually, the court must determine whether the agree-
ment is a cropper contract or a crop-share lease. Sometimes, how-
ever, the situation calls for a determination of whether the parties
intended to create a crop-share lease or a tenancy in common in the
crops. Additionally, some relationships, especially those involving
livestock shares, can be interpreted as partnerships. Because the
characterization of the farming relationship will significantly affect
the result in bankruptcy, it is important at the outset to articulate the
distinctions between these legal arrangements.
A. Landlord- Tenant or Employer-Employee?
A landowner and a farmer may choose to formalize either a ten-
ancy or a cropper contract. Absent a clear indication of their intent,
19 "In resolving questions of lease vitality bankruptcy courts look to state law.... This
is consistent with the policy of deference to state law in determination of property rights,
absent conflict with the Bankruptcy Statute." Hazen v. Hospitality Assocs., Inc. (In re Hospi-
tality Assocs., Inc.), 6 Bankr. 778, 780 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); see also Waldschmidt v. Appleton
Inv. Co. (In re Zienel Furniture, Inc.), 13 Bankr. 264 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981); Kearny Mesa
Crossroads v. Acorn Invs. (In re Acorn Invs.), 8 Bankr. 506 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); Seidle v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Belize Airways Ltd.), 5 Bankr. 152 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1980).
20 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
21 A livestock-share lease raises other issues. See text accompanying notes 44-52 infta.
[19841
FARM LEASE IN BANKRUPTCY
the court must characterize their relationship. In Hampton v. Struve,22
the Nebraska Supreme Court distinguished between the two types of
arrangements:
A lease of real estate is a hiring or renting of it for a certain time
for a named consideration. A tenant rents the land and pays for
it either in money or a part of the crops or the equivalent. A
cropper is a hired hand who farms the land and who is paid for
his labor with a share of the crops he works to produce and har-
vest. The crop belongs to the owner of the land and he pays for
the labor-of producing it with a part of the crop. A cropper does
not have the right of exclusive possession of the land and has no
estate in the crop until he is assigned his share thereof by the
owner of the land.23
Thus, under a crop-share lease the farmer has an interest in the land
and a property right in the crops, whereas under a cropper contract
the farmer is an employee who has no interest in the land and who
receives a portion of the crops as wages. 24
When determining whether an agreement to farm on shares is a
tenancy or a cropper contract, a court looks to the intention of the
parties as inferred from the .language of the document and surround-
ing circumstances. 25 Where the contract to farm on shares is oral
and informal, the question of whether the farmer is a tenant or an
employee is one of fact.26
Courts generally consider an agreement that grants the farmer
exclusive possession of the land conclusive evidence of a landlord-
tenant relationship. 27 In many instances, however, a farmer with his
own land, home, farm buildings and equipment will expand his op-
eration by farming a piece of land that belongs to a neighboring
landowner. The farmer will need access to the land to conduct farm-
ing operations, but the parties will often not think to articulate the
farmer's right to exclusive possession because that right is not cur-
rently relevant to their relationship. In these instances, courts can
infer a landlord-tenant relationship from the presence of factors such
22 160 Neb. 305, 70 N.W.2d 74 (1955).
23 Id at 311, 70 N.W.2d at 78 (citations omitted).
24 Dopheide v. Schoeppner, 163 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Iowa 1968).
25 Davis v. Burton, 126 Mont. 137, 140, 246 P.2d 236, 238 (1952).
26 The solution requires determination of the true intention of the parties. Dophtid, 163
N.W.2d at 362; Smith v. McNew, 381 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Hampton v.
Struve, 160 Neb. 305, 311-12, 70 N.W.2d 74, 78 (1955); Cry v. J. W. Bass Hardware, 273 S.W.
347, 349 (rex. Civ. App. 1925).
27 Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 323, 32 N.W.2d 649, 653
(1948); Davis, 126 Mont. at 140, 246 P.2d at 238;Hampton, 160 Neb. at 312, 70 N.W.2d at 78.
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as provisions that specify a fixed term,28 the surrender of possession at
the end of the term, 29 a prohibition against underletting or sublet-
ting,30 a requirement for the farmer to repair improvements on the
premises, 31 the right of the farmer to divide the crop, 32 and the
farmer's exercise of a large measure of control over his own activity. 33
In contrast, provisions specifying that the landowner will retain pos-
session of the land and title to the crop, exert considerable control
over the farmer's activity, and supply most or all of the necessary
inputs evidence an intent to create an employer-employee
relationship. 34
As one court acknowledged: "There is much confusion and not
a little conflict in the decided cases as to the precise relation of the
parties created by a contract [to farm on shares]. ' ' 35 This difficulty
and the possibility of an unanticipated characterization of the land-
owner-farmer relationship suggest that a party to a contract to farm
on shares should insist that the agreement be carefully drafted.
B. Tenancy in Common
The courts in at least two states, Illinois and Minnesota, have
decided that when a contract to farm on shares does not clearly de-
fine the nature of the parties' agreement, the agreement creates
either a landlord-tenant relationship or a tenancy in common in the
crops, depending on the intention of the parties.36 In Wheeler v. Sani-
tag District,37 the Illinois Supreme Court explained:
Where one leases land to another for the purpose of raising a
single crop, of which the landowner is to have one part for his
rent and the cultivator the remaining part for his pay, the ques-
28 See Larson, 226 Minn. at 323, 32 N.W.2d at 653;Hampton, 160 Neb. at 312, 70 N.W.2d
at 78.
29 See Larson, 226 Minn. at 323, 32 N.W.2d at 653; Hampton, 160 Neb. at 312, 70 N.W.2d
at 78.
30 See Larson, 226 Minn. at 323, 32 N.W.2d at 653; Hampton, 160 Neb. at 312, 70 N.W.2d
at 78.
31 See Larson, 226 Minn. at 323,32 N.W. 2d at 653;Hampton, 160 Neb. at 312; 70 N.W.2d
at 78.
32 See Dopheide, 163 N.W.2d at 363.
33 Id ; see a/so Wood v. Garrison, 139 Ky. 603, 62 S.W. 728 (1901).
34 Gibbons v. Huntsinger, 105 Mont. 562, 570, 74 P.2d 443, 447 (1937) (quoting Wells-
Dickey Co. v. Embody, 82 Mont. 150, 163, 266 P. 869, 874 (1928)).
35 Hampton, 160 Neb. at 311, 70 N.W.2d at 78.
36 Flowers v. Mehrhoff (In re Estate of Flowers), 95 Ill. App. 3d 333, 335, 420 N.E.2d 216,
218 (1981); Larson, 226 Minn. at 326, 32 N.W.2d at 655; see also Wheeler v. Sanitary Dist., 270
Ill. 461, 469-70, 110 N.E. 605, 609 (1915); Alwood v. Ruckman, 21 Ill. 200, 200-01 (1859).
37 270 Ill. 461, 110 N.E. 605 (1915).
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tion whether the relation of landlord and tenant exists or the two
are tenants in common depends on the intention of the parties,
which is usually to be inferred from the circumstances, of which
the possession is, in general, determining. Where it is doubtful
whether the possession and control are exclusive in the tenant or
joint in the owner and cultivator, and whether the right of entry
continues for the year or only until the crop is removed, the incli-
nation is to find in favor of the latter conclusion.38
This focus on the parties' intention is consistent with the right of
landowner and farmer to determine the legal nature of their relation-
ship. Nonetheless, courts must define carefully the distinctions be-
tween the various relationships to avoid inconsistent results. For
example, Illinois courts have generally held that a contract to farm
on shares creates either a landlord-tenant relationship or a tenancy in
common; reported decisions usually have not discussed employer-em-
ployee relationships.3 9 But in the recent decision of Flowers V.
MehrhoJ' (In re Estate of Flowers),4° the Illinois Court of Appeals, after
quoting at length from Wheeler, looked to decisions from other juris-
dictions and held that a contract to farm on shares can create a land-
lord-tenant relationship, an employer-employee relationship, a
tenancy in common, or a partnership, depending on the intention of
the parties.41 The Flowers decision's departure from precedent cre-
ates confusion and encourages courts to continue giving different in-
terpretations to essentially identical contracts.42
Moreover, courts do not always make a clear distinction be-
tween leaseholds and tenancies in common. Several courts have held
that every contract to farm on shares, whether a crop-share lease or
cropper contract, creates a tenancy in common in the crop. 43 Parties
38 Id at 469-70, 110 N.E. at 609 (citation omitted).
39 See id at 469-70, 110 N.E. at 609; Alwood, 21 111. at 201.
40 95 Ill. App. 3d 333, 420 N.E.2d 216 (1981).
41 Id. at 335, 420 N.E.2d at 218.
42 For example, in Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 32 N.W.2d
649 (1948), the plaintiff alleged that the contract to farm on shares created a tenancy in
common, but the defendant argued that it created a landlord-tenant relationship. The court
recognized that a contract to farm on shares could create either relationship, depending on
the intention of the parties. Nonetheless, the court held that the contract at issue created a
landlord-tenant relationship and did not discuss what factors would be evidence of an intent
to create a tenancy in common.
43 See Underhill v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 15 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1926); Devereaux
Mortgage Co. v. Walker, 46 Idaho 431,436, 268 P. 37, 39 (1928); Minneapolis Iron Store Co.
v. Branum, 36 N.D. 355, 380, 162 N.W. 543, 552 (1917); Fuhrman v. Interior Warehouse Co.,
64 Wash. 159, 161, 116 P. 666, 667 (1911).
The court in Devereaur explained the rationale underlying this approach:
To hold that each party has at all times an ownership in the growing crops propor-
[Vol. 59:598]
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who enter into any type of contract to farm on shares in these states
should be aware that courts may so interpret the contract unless the
parties clearly show a contrary intent in the agreement.
C. Partnership
In the South Dakota case of Cedarburg v. Guernsey 44 a landowner
and a tenant-farmer entered into a contract to farm on shares. The
farmer was to farm for five years entirely at his own expense and
receive half the proceeds from the sale of all livestock and crops. The
plaintiff sued both landlord and tenant to recover the balance due
for services and labor performed on the leased land, alleging that
both were liable because the contract created a partnership.
In construing the contract, the court rejected the partnership ar-
gument.45 Yet the court acknowledged in dictum that if the farming
operation had been conducted at the joint and equal expense of the
parties, with the net proceeds equally divided between them, the par-
ties would have been partners. Under this rationale, many livestock-
share leases-particularly those in which the landlord and tenant
own one-half of the livestock, split the cost of supplies, and receive
one-half of the livestock and crop income-would create partner-
ships. Indeed, other courts have wrestled with the question of
whether a livestock-share lease creates a partnership.46
Whether a livestock-share lease creates a partnership between
farmer and landowner depends, as in the other arrangements, on the
tionate to the share he will ultimately receive, though the right to the possession be
in the producer until harvested, will best effectuate the intention of the parties, and
to ascertain intention rather than classify relations created should, it would seem, be
the principal concern of the court.
46 Idaho at 440, 268 P. at 40.
44 12 S.D. 77, 80 N.W. 159 (1899).
45 The court explained:
All cropping contracts have, to a certain extent, the element of division of profits,
but such contracts are rarely held to be partnership contracts. They lack two of the
essential elements of a partnership, namely, that the parties are mutually principals
of and agents for each other and that the business is carried on joint account.
Id. at 81, 80 N.W. at 160. The court's use of the word "cropping" in the quoted excerpt does
not imply that the relationship was a cropper contract instead of a lease.
46 For example, Drennan v. Peck (In re Estate of Drennan), 9 Ill. App. 2d 324, 132
N.E.2d 599 (1956), held that a partnership arrangement could be inferred from the lease
agreements through evidence showing that the parties operated a joint venture with an ar-
rangement to share profits. But in United States v. Farrington, 244 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1957),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying Indiana law, deter-
mined that the agreement involved, characterized by the parties as a lease, did not create a
partnership.
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intention of the parties.47 In United States v. Farington ,48 a federal
court applying Indiana law found that the circumstances did not es-
tablish the existence of a partnership, but instead evidenced the par-
ties' intention to create a landlord-tenant relationship. 49 The court
defined a partnership as a " 'voluntary contract of association for the
purpose of sharing the profits and losses that arise from the use of
capital, skill, or labor in a common enterprise,'" together with "'an
intention on the part of the principals to form a partnership.' "50 In
finding that the contract created a landlord-tenant relationship, the
court stressed the following factors: the landowner's lack of control
over farm management; the landowner's obligation to pay half the
expenses, including those not connected with the livestock; the ab-
sence of any joint account or common fund from which expenses
were paid; the division and payment of proceeds from the sale of
47 See,e.g. , Farrington, 244 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1957) (applying Indiana law); Drennan, 9 Il1.
App. 2d 324, 132 N.E.2d 599 (1956); Roach v. Rector, 93 Ark. 521, 123 S.W. 399 (1909). The
question of whether a livestock-share lease creates a partnership may be decided in part by
reference to the relevant state's version of the Uniform Partnership Act. The Uniform Part-
nership Act defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as UPA]. The Act further clarifies this definition of partnership. A tenancy in common
or joint ownership of property does not of itself establish a partnership, even if the co-owners
share the profits from use of the property. UPA § 7(2). Sharing gross returns alone is not
sufficient to establish a partnership, "whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or
common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived." UPA § 7(3).
Sharing profits of a business is prima facie evidence of partnership, UPA § 7(4), but a part-
nership cannot be inferred when a share of the profits was received as payment of rent to a
landlord. UPA § 7(4)(b). In some cases, a party will be able to establish that a livestock-
share lease does not create a partnership, because the landowner's share of the profits from
the sale of the livestock was really rent. But the characterization of the landowner's share of
the profits as rent may be conclusory, in the absence of other evidence pointing toward a
lease, and thus should not prevent the inference of partnership from shared profits.
48 244 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1957).
49 The landowner and tenant-farmer had agreed to an arrangement characterized by the
parties as a lease. The farmer was to furnish all necessary tools and equipment. The parties
were to own equal shares in all livestock on the farm and to share equally all expenses in-
volved in both the livestock operation and the rest of the farm. On the same day that the
farmer signed the lease, he executed a chattel mortgage in his interest in the livestock in favor
of the Farmers Home Administration ("FmHA"). Subsequently, the farmer and the land-
owner delivered animals to livestock commission firms for sale. Upon sale, each received a
check for half the proceeds. The FmHA brought an action against the livestock commission
firms for conversion. The firms argued that the lease created a dual relationship, with the
provisions relating to the livestock operation creating a partnership and the provisions relat-
ing to the rest of the farm creating a landlord-tenant relationship. They asserted that the
livestock was partnership property with legal title in the partnership rather than in the farmer
and the landowner individually.
50 244 F.2d at 113 (quoting Watson v. Watson, 231 Ind. 385, 387, 108 N.E.2d 893, 895
(1952)).
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livestock to the parties as individuals, not as partners; and the par-
ties' failure to keep partnership books or to file partnership tax re-
turns. This decision is flawed in that the court based its finding of a
tenancy on factors extrinsic to the lease, whereas the lease provisions
themselves actually created a partnership. 51
One commentator has suggested that courts should not interpret
a livestock-share lease to create a partnership unless the lease demon-
strates such a specific intent, or the agreement contains elements that
would lead third parties to believe there is a partnership.52 These
elements would include a common fund, common books, shared
management, or preparation of partnership income tax returns. Par-
ties who enter a livestock-share lease that contains one or more of
these arrangements or provides that they will share profits should be
aware of the risk that their relationship may be interpreted as a part-
nership in the event of a bankruptcy or insolvency.
II. Treatment of Crops and Livestock in Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy proceeding creates an estate that includes all of
the debtor's legal or equitable property interests as of the commence-
ment of the case.53 Pursuant to section 542(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, a nondebtor entity must turn over to the estate all the debtor's
property in its possession, custody, or control. When a party to a
51 See Note, 1957 ILL. L.F. 532. The author reasons that the lease provisions relating to
the livestock operation created a partnership because the livestock were owned jointly and
both expenses and gross receipts were to be shared.
Compare Farrington with Drennan v. Peck (In re Estate of Drennan), 9 Ill. App. 2d 324,
132 N.E.2d 599 (1956), where the court held that a decedent and his two sons had carried on
their livestock operation, the subject of an informal oral agreement, as a partnership rather
than a landlord-tenant relationship. The court defined a partnership as a relationship in
which parties join together to carry on a trade or venture for their common benefit, each
contributing property or services and having a community of interests in the profits. Id at
329, 132 N.E.2d at 602. The court articulated several characteristics of the relationship that
supported its finding of a partnership: all proceeds of the operation were deposited in one
bank account, from which all expenses of the operation were paid; machinery and livestock
were traded and purchased in the name of this account; and profits from the operation were
withdrawn by all three parties, each receiving approximately one third of the annual profits.
Id. at 328, 132 N.E.2d at 601.
Drennan is not necessarily inconsistent with Farington. In Drennan, many of the integral
aspects of the business operated from a joint account; in Farington the absence of a joint
account helped to negate the conclusion that a partnership existed.
52 See Hannah, Illinois Farm Tenancy La--Static or Evolving?, 1977 S. ILL. U.LJ. 359, 376.
53 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982). On farm bankruptcy generally, see 2J. JUERGENSMEYER &
J. WADLEY, sUpra note 14, at ch. 35; Anderson & Rainach, Farmer Reorganizations Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 28 Loy. L. REv. 439 (1982); Landers, Reorganizing a Farm Business Under Chap-
ter 11, 5 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 11 (1983); Looney, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and The
Farmer: A Survey of Applicable Provisivns, 25 S.D.L. REV. 509 (1980).
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farm lease enters bankruptcy, the debtor's property may include
crops or livestock that are being grown or raised pursuant to the
lease. And regardless of whether the debtor is landowner or farmer,
the trustee or debtor in possession54 will probably try to include crops
and livestock produced on the leased property in the debtor's estate.
In some bankruptcy cases, the nondebtor party to the lease will
resist inclusion of the crops and livestock in the estate, forcing the
bankruptcy court to decide whether these belong to the estate and, if
so, whether the nondebtor enjoys any property interest in them. Be-
cause the parties' property rights in the crops and livestock arise from
the nature of their relationship (e.g. lease, cropper contract, partner-
ship, or tenancy in common), the parties will often interpret their
agreement differently. The bankruptcy court will first determine the
nature of the relationship, and then ascertain the resulting property
rights in the crops and livestock.
54 The trustee is the official representative of the debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a)
(1982). In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the trustee must collect and reduce to money the property
of the estate and liquidate the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interest of
the parties. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). The trustee must account for all property received and
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor. Id.
In a Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor may remain in control of the farming opera-
tion and is then called the "debtor in possession." When no trustee is appointed, the debtor
in possession has all the rights, powers, and duties of a trustee in a Chapter 11 reorganization.
I1 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1982). At the request of a party in interest, a trustee shall be appointed
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement; or (2) if
the appointment is in the interests of creditors, equity security holders, and other interests of
the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). As specified in § 1106(a), the trustee shall investigate
the debtor's finances and the desirability of continuing the operation, file a report of debtor
fraud, dishonesty, or mismanagement, and perform certain of the duties specified in § 704.
The trustee shall also, pursuant to § 1121, file a reorganization plan. A debtor in possession
can perform most of the trustee's functions, but he cannot investigate his own finances or
report improper behavior. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
In some instances, the party to a farm lease or cropper contract may prefer a Chapter 13
adjustment of debts. Relief under Chapter 13 is available only to an individual or to an
individual and spouse, I 1 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982); corporations and partnerships are not eligi-
ble. In addition, relief is available only to an "individual with regular income," that is, an
individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to make payments under a Chapter
13 plan. Id The Code also imposes maximum debt limits for Chapter 13 cases. An individ-
ual eligible for Chapter 13 must have unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and secured debts
of less than $350,000. Id The relatively high debt levels often inherent in modern farming
operations may prevent many farmers from qualifying for Chapter 13 relief.
During the Chapter 13 adjustment, a debtor engaged in business may continue the oper-
ation, subject to any limitations imposed by the court. 11 U.S.C. § 1304(b) (1982). A debtor
engaged in business is a debtor who is self-employed and incurs trade credit in the production
of income from that employment. 11 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982). The Code provides the means
necessary to operate the business: the debtor has most of the power of the trustee under § 363
regarding the use, sale, or lease of property, and all the powers of the trustee under § 364 to
obtain credit.
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A. Liens and Reservation of Title
1. Statutory liens
Usually, special statutory protections apply to a true landlord-
tenant relationship. Many states protect the landlord-party to a
farm lease with a lien on the crops for rent 55 and advances. 56 The
Illinois lien on crops is typical:
Every landlord shall have a lien upon the crops grown or growing
upon the demised premises for the rent thereof, whether the same
is payable wholly or in part in money or specific articles of prop-
erty or products of the premises, or labor, and also for the faithful
performance of the terms of the lease.57
The lien attaches at the time the crops begin to grow58 and continues
for six months after the expiration of the lease term. It must be en-
forced in an action of replevin, distress for rent,59 or foreclosure. Illi-
nois courts initially held that a subsequent purchaser of the crops is
subject to the lien, so long as he has knowledge of the tenancy and
the origin of the crops.6° To meet this notice requirement, many Illi-
nois landowners recorded their leases in the county where the crops
were grown or gave actual notice of the lease to major grain elevators
in the surrounding community. The lien statute was recently
amended, however, and now requires the landlord to give actual no-
tice to potential buyers; otherwise, good faith purchasers take the
crops free of the landlord's lien. 61
55 E.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9-30 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-316 (1983); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 60.12.020 (1961); see also statutes cited in 2A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN,
supra note 13, 1 261[2] n.ll.
56 Eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-203 (1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 441.290 (Vernon 1952);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 60.12.020 (1961); see also statutes cited in 2A R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN,supra note 13, 1261[2] n.11.
57 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-316 (1983). Amendment of the landlord's lien statute in
1983 did not affect the quoted material. See note 61 infra.
58 Harvey v. Hampton, 108 Ill. App. 501 (1903); Watt v. Scofield, 76 Ill. 261 (1875).
59 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 9-301 to -321 (1983).
60 See Faith v. Taylor, 69 Ill. App. 419 (1896); Finney v. Harding, 136 Ill. 573 (1891).
61 The Illinois legislature amended the notice provisions of the landlord's lien, effective
August 16, 1983. Pub. Act 83-70, codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 9-316, 9-316.1
(1983). The amended law provides that a good faith purchaser takes crops free of the land-
lord's lien unless, within six months prior to the purchase, the landlord provides written no-
tice of his lien to the purchaser by registered or certified mail. The notice must include the
names and addresses of landlord and tenant and identify the leased property clearly. Id § 9-
316.
To facilitate the landlord's actual notice obligation, the statute provides that the land-
lord may require the tenant to disclose the name of the person to whom the tenant intends to
sell the crops; the tenant may not sell the crops to any other person. Id A tenant who
violates the disclosure and sale requirements is subject to criminal prosecution. Id § 9-316.1.
[1984]
FARM LEASE IN BANKRUPTCY
The Illinois lien and similar statutory provisions will not protect
a landlord when a tenant enters bankruptcy. Sections 545(3) and
543(4) of the Bankruptcy Code specifically empower the trustee to
avoid statutory liens for rent and liens of distress for rent.62 The defi-
nition of "statutory lien" in section 101(38)63 indicates that the
trustee can avoid both statutory and nonstatutory liens of distress for
rent.6 According to relevant House and Senate committee reports,
the trustee can avoid the lien even if it has been enforced by sale
prior to the filing of the petition.65 Thus, when a farm tenant enters
bankruptcy, the trustee or the tenant as debtor in possession will un-
doubtedly use section 545 to avoid the statutory lien for rent, as well
as any liens of distress for rent in the crops.66 The trustee can avoid
the lien even if it has been perfected prior to the bankruptcy. 67 Simi-
larly, filing the lease in the county office for real estate records should
not affect the trustee's avoidance power, for neither the Code nor its
legislative history indicates that the trustee's power to avoid statutory
62 11 U.S.C. §§ 545(3), (4) (1982).
63 The Code states:
"[S]tatutory lien" means lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circum-
stances or conditions, or lien of distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but does
not include security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien is
provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such interest or lien is
made fully effective by statute ...
11 U.S.C. § 101(38) (1982).
64 The debtor's estate will consist of property brought back into the estate by the trustee's
avoiding powers, as well as property that the debtor turns over to the trustee. The trustee's
avoiding powers are an essential part of the bankruptcy proceeding. As one commentator has
explained:
These provisions provide the creditors of a bankrupt estate, acting through the
trustee in bankruptcy, with the rights and powers necessary to insure that actions by
the bankrupt debtor or by aggressive creditors in the immediate prebankruptcy pe-
riod do not thwart one of the fundamental purposes of the bankruptcy laws, to
provide a fair and equal distribution of a bankrupt's assets.
Levin, An Introduction to the Trstee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173 (1979). The
trustee can avoid transfers under the following provisions: § 544 ("strong-arm" clause); § 545
(statutory liens); § 547 (preferences); § 548 (fraudulent conveyances); and § 549 (postpetition
transfers). In a Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor in possession also has avoiding powers.
I1 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982).
65 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 371, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6327; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5871.
66 Compare Driskill v. Hutchinson, Hutchinson and Hudgins (In re Furniture Disc.
Stores, Inc.), 11 Bankr. 5, 7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980), where the court held that the Texas
statutory lien for rent in the inventory of a bankrupt furniture store was avoidable under
§545. J
67 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, 1 67.23[2], at 290-91 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
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liens for rent is conditioned on the lack of perfection or the failure to
file the lease in the county office for real estate records.
Unlike the typical lien for rent, the laborer's lien may remain
valid following bankruptcy. This lien may help a farmer when the
landowner enters bankruptcy, particularly if the court interprets the
agreement between farmer and landowner as a cropper contract, and
the state where the farm is located protects laborers with a statutory
lien. For example, the Georgia laborer's lien provides: "Laborers
shall also have a special lien on the products of their labor, which lien
shall be superior to all other liens except liens for taxes and special
liens of landlords on yearly crops."' ' This lien arises on completion
of the contract of labor, but will not defeat the claims of bona fide
purchasers without notice until it has been executed and levied.69
The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that a cropper is a laborer
within the meaning of the Georgia laborer's lien. 70 Therefore, the
Georgia cropper receives a lien on the crops when he completes the
terms of the agreement.
If the laborer's lien is executed and levied before the landowner
enters bankruptcy, it cannot be avoided. Thus, the trustee's power,
under section 545(1), to avoid liens that become effective when the
debtor enters bankruptcy or becomes insolvent does not apply to the
Georgia laborer's lien, because that lien arises upon completion of
the labor contract. Section 545(2) empowers the trustee to avoid
statutory liens that are not perfected or enforceable against a bona
fide purchaser who purchases the property on the date of the bank-
ruptcy filing; but the Georgia laborer's lien is enforceable against a
bona fide purchaser once it has been properly executed and levied. 71
Several considerations justify the policy of allowing the trustee
to avoid the statutory lien for rent, while the statutory laborer's lien
is preserved. The laborer has directly enriched the landowner-
debtor's estate with identifiable products that he created with his
own labor, and it would be unfair to classify him among the estate's
other general creditors. Moreover, the enforcement of laborer's liens
is consistent with the Code priority for wage claims. 72 In contrast,
the landlord does not differ significantly from any of the tenant-
68 GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1802 (Supp. 1982).
69 Id. § 67-1803.
70 Faircloth v. Webb, 125 Ga. 230, 53 S.E. 592 (1906).
71 Compare In re Empire Granite Co., 42 F. Supp. 450, 454-55 (M.D. Ga. 1942), where
the court said that the Georgia laborer's lien could not be given effect in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding if it had not been executed and levied in accordance with Georgia law.
72 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1982). See note 147 infra and accompanying text.
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debtor's other general creditors. Any lien in favor of the landlord
favors a particular class of general creditors, a priority that should
not exist in bankruptcy law.
2. Consensual liens and reservation of title
Some landowners also try to protect themselves by creating a
security interest for the rent in the crops, obtaining the interest in
either the farm lease or a separate document. If the security interest
is properly created and perfected pursuant to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code ("U.C.C."),73 the trustee will probably not be able to use
section 545 to avoid a consensual lien for rent.74 The trustee's avoid-
ing powers extend only to statutory liens for rent and liens of distress
for rent. Moreover, section 101(38) specifically excludes security in-
terests from the definition of "statutory lien." Preserving the consen-
sual lien in crops supports the policy behind section 545, namely that
the trustee should avoid statutory liens that favor certain classes of
general creditors.75 When the lien results from the consent of the
parties rather than from the operation of state law, this risk is not
present.
Yet the trustee may be able to avoid consensual liens by one of
the other bankruptcy avoiding powers. Under section 544(a)(1), for
example, the trustee has the rights and powers of a judicial lien credi-
tor over all the debtor's property as of the commencement of the
bankruptcy case.76 Thus, to be effective in bankruptcy, a consensual
lien in farm lease crops must comply with the perfection require-
ments of U.C.C. Article 9. U.C.C. section 9-102(1) states that Article
9 applies to any transaction, regardless of form, intended to create a
security interest in goods.7 7 As the comment to that section explains,
"[t]he main purpose of this Section is to bring all consensual security
interests in personal property and fixtures under this Article."178 Ac-
cordingly, several courts have held that a landlord's consensual lien
in the tenant's chattels for rent must be perfected according to the
73 See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-303, 9-401 (1972). See also Meyer, Should Farm Leases Include an
Article 9 &ecuil Interest?, 5 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 60, 61-65 (1983), for an explanation of how
to create and perfect a security interest in crops for rent, either in the lease itself or in a
separate document. Meyer notes that the security interest may provide limited protection,
particularly if the tenant has already executed security agreements covering the crops with
other lenders. Id. at 66.
74 See 4 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY, 545.04[4] (L. King 15th ed. 1983).
75 Id.
76 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982).
77 U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(a) (1972).
78 Id comment.
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requirements of Article 9.79 Additionally, pre-U.C.C. cases in Illinois
applied a similar principle.80
The landowner must therefore ensure that the security interest is
properly created and perfected pursuant to Article 9.81 When the
debtor is a farmer, filing is the usual method employed to perfect a
security interest.82 If the landlord fails to file, or files in the wrong
place, U.C.C. section 9-303 indicates that the security interest will
remain unperfected. 83 Although an unperfected security interest is
effective against the debtor, U.C.C. section 301(1)(b) provides that
the rights of a holder of an unperfected security interest are
subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor
before the security interest is perfected.8 4 Because Bankruptcy Code
section 544(a) (1) grants the trustee the rights and powers of a judicial
lien creditor, the trustee will have the power to avoid the unperfected
security interest in the crops. In Driskill v. Hutchinson, Hutchinson and
Hudgins (In re Furniture Discount Stores),85 for example, the bankruptcy
court refused to uphold the landlord's consensual lien for rent in the
inventory of the bankrupt furniture store because the lien had not
been perfected properly.8 6
Some landowners, dissatisfied with the protection that the con-
79 See Todsen v. Runge, 211 Neb. 226, 318 N.W.2d 88 (1982), involving a farm lease
providing that the landlord would have a lien on the crops raised on the leased premises until
the final rent payments were made; see also Bank of N. Am. v. Kruger, 551 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977).
80 See Gubbins v. Equitable Trust Co., 80 Ill. App. 17 (1898); Packard v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 67 Ill. App. 598 (1896).
81 See Meyer, supra note 73. For a thorough discussion of additional problems that may
be involved when crops are the collateral for a security interest, see Meyer, "Crops"as Collateral
For an Article 9 Securty Interest and Related Problems, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Meyer, "Crops" as Collateral]. Meyer suggests that in a good collateral description for crops:
[O]ne would want to cover all crops growing or to be grown in this year and suc-
ceeding years, all harvested crops wherever stored, and any document of title or
other document representing a storage obligation, including, but not limited to,
warehouse receipts, negotiable or nonnegotiable, which may be received for crops
owned by the debtor but stored off the farm.
Id at 14 (footnote omitted). In certain situations, the landowner will also want to include
some of the tenant's other personalty, such as livestock and machinery, as collateral. The
landowner must then ensure that filing requirements are met for this additional collateral.
82 See Meyer, supra note 73, at 63.
83 U.C.C. § 9-303 (1972).
84 U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1972).
85 11 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
86 The trustee may also be able to avoid the consensual lien under § 547 regarding pref-
erences and § 548 regarding fraudulent transfers and obligations. For discussion of these pro-
visions of the Code, see G. BRODY, W. TAGGART & G. LEE, PRACTICING UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 113-64 (1979); Clark, Prteferences Under the Old and New Bankruptq
Acts, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 154 (1979); Levin, supra note 64.
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sensual lien provides, prefer to reserve title to all crops in either the
lease or the cropper contract. While this provision would seem to
give the landowner outright ownership of all the crops on the in-
volved land, some courts have held that such a provision is a chattel
mortgage, and they have required filing in accordance with the state
statute governing chattel mortgages. 87 Following this precedent, the
North Dakota Supreme Court in Minneapolis Iron Store v. Branum88
held that a crop-share lease provision reserving title to the landlord
created a lien on the tenant's share that operated like a chattel mort-
gage to secure any advances the landlord made to the tenant.
Although the cases applying this rationale were decided prior to
adoption of the U.C.C., their very existence suggests that a landlord's
reservation of title to crops should be perfected under U.C.C. proce-
dures. Indeed, the trustee of a farm debtor may be expected to assert
that the reservation of title to crops in a farm lease or cropper con-
tract does not give the landowner outright ownership of the crops,
but instead gives him a security interest in the crops for his share,
and as such the interest must be perfected pursuant to Article 9 of
the U.C.C. To refute this assertion adequately, the contract provi-
sion should indicate clearly that the parties intended to reserve own-
ership of the crops in the landowner, and that they did not intend to
create a security interest. Moreover, the cautious landowner will per-
fect the reservation of title according to Article 9, thereby avoiding
the possibility of challenge on these grounds.89
B. Property Rights in Crops Under Crop-Share Leases
and Cropper Contracts
Once the bankruptcy court has ascertained the nature of the re-
lationship that an agreement to farm on shares created, it must then
decide what property rights flow from the relationship. Because
crops are often a major asset in a farmer's estate, allocation of the
rights in the crops plays a crucial role in the bankruptcy proceeding.
In making this determination, the bankruptcy court will look to state
87 Nelson v. McDonald, 153 Minn. 474, 191 N.W. 281 (1922); McNeal v. Ryder, 79
Minn. 153, 81 N.W. 830 (1900). But see Pearson v. Lafferty, 193 S.W. 40, 42 (Mo. Ct. App.
1917), where the court rejected the proposition that a contract with such a provision is in
effect a chattel mortgage that must be filed for record.
88 36 N.D. 355, 162 N.W. 543 (1917).
89 Compare U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1972), which provides that title retention contracts create
article 9 security interests.
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law.90
State courts have generally held that under a crop-share lease,
title to the crops remains in the tenant until he severs (harvests) the
crops and divides them.9' In contrast, under a cropper contract, title
to crops remains in the landowner until he divides them.92 The par-
ties can alter these general rules by contract. 93
Courts have employed these property rules primarily in cases
involving conversion of crops grown under a contract to farm on
shares. Thus, courts have held that under a crop-share lease only the
tenant can sue for conversion of crops.94 The tenant can sue the
landlord, or anyone holding through the landlord, for conversion of
crops,9 5 but the landlord cannot sue the tenant or the tenant's buyer
for conversion. 96 Courts have articulated different rules for cropper
contracts; because of the different nature of that relationship, only
the landowner can sue third parties for conversion of crops.9 7 More-
over, when the landowner denies the cropper access to the crops the
cropper cannot sue him for conversion, but instead must sue for
breach of contract.98
Relying on the above precedent, parties have argued that a
landlord under a crop-share lease has no property interest in the
crops until division.99 Other courts, however, have recognized that
both a landlord under a crop-share lease, and a cropper under a
cropper contract, have a property interest in the crops before divi-
sion. The precise nature of the interest turns on whether the court
90 See Hazen v. Hospitality Assocs., Inc. (In re Hospitality Assocs., Inc.), 6 Bankr. 778,
780-81 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980).
91 See, e.g., Grommes v. Town of Aurora, 37 11. App. 2d 1, 185 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1962);
Schoenlau-Steiner Trunk Top & Veneer Co. v. Hilderbrand, 152 Tenn. 166, 274 S.W. 544,
547 (1925); Benhart v. Gorham, 14 Wash. App. 723, 724, 544 P.2d 141, 143 (1976).
92 See, e.g., Burns v. Vaughan, 216 Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949); Chickasha Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Linn, 80 Okla. 233, 195 P. 769 (1921); Kelly v. Rummerfield, 117 Wis. 620, 94
N.W. 649 (1903).
93 See, e.g., Benhart, 14 Wash. App. at 724-25, 544 P.2d at 143.
94 See Babcock v. Mississippi River Power Co., 113 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1940) (applying
Illinois law); Grommes v. Town of Aurora, 37 Ill. App. 2d 1, 185 N.E.2d 3 (1962).
95 See Townsend v. Bussey, 4 So. 2d 199 (Ala. 1941); De Spain v. Coley, 65 Okla. 31, 162
P. 756 (1916).
96 See Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 32 N.W.2d 649 (1948);
Schoenlau-Steiner Trunk Top & Veneer Co. v. Hilderbrand, 152 Tenn. 166, 274 S.W. 544
(1925).
97 See Burns v. Vaughn, 216 Ark. 128, 224 S.W. 2d 365 (1949); Chickasha Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Linn, 80 Okla. 233, 195 P. 769 (1921).
98 See Taylor v. Riggins, 129 Okla. 57, 263 P. 146 (1928).
99 See, e.g., Riddle v. Dow, 98 Iowa 7, 9, 66 N.W. 1066, 1066 (1896).
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holds that every contract to farm on shares, regardless of its particu-
lar characterization, creates a tenancy in common in the crops.
Where state law does not find a tenancy in common to exist in
all crop-share or cropper relationships, the courts face difficulty in
defining the landlord's and farmer's property interests in the crops.
For example, in Riddle v. Dow, 00 the Iowa Supreme Court had to
determine whether the landlord had a mortgagable interest in crops
grown pursuant to a crop-share lease prior to the crops' division.
The plaintiff judgment creditors, whose right in the crops would be
inferior to the mortgagee's if such an interest were recognized, ar-
gued that the landlord had no interest in the crops until division.
But the court rejected this argument, noting that the cases cited in
support of it generally concerned tenant claims that the landlord had
converted the crops, or that the landlord's share of the crops did not
transfer with the land on conveyance of the property. The court held
that
the landlord had a mortgagable interest in the crops in contro-
versy when the mortgage was given; that the interest was made
definite and certain when his share was separated and deter-
mined; [and] that the mortgage fully attached to that share when
it was thus ascertained if it had not been operative before
101
Nevertheless, in Riddle, the Court did not explain the nature of the
landlord's interest or ascertain exactly when it arose.
In Finl v. McClure,10 2 the Supreme Court of Kansas specifically
addressed these issues. An earlier Kansas decision, 45yand v.
Merrill,0 3 had held that the landlord's title to crops grown pursuant
to a crop-share lease did not attach until the crops' maturity. The
Finley court, in part overruling Wyandt, held that "the landlord's [in-
terest in his] share of the crop attaches after the crop is planted and
his inchoate interest is one which he may sell before maturity of the
crop and which ripens into full ownership with such maturity." 0 4 As
100 98 Iowa 7, 66 N.W. 1066 (1896).
101 Id. at 19, 66 N.W. at 1069. See also Orcutt v. Moore, 134 Mass. 48 (1883), where the
court stated that the landlord has a mortgagable interest in crops grown pursuant to a crop-
share lease, if the contract provides that the specific products are to belong to the parties
jointly, and are to be divided, but that the landlord has no such interest if the contract pro-
vides that the tenant is to pay as rent a share of the crops, or the equivalent.
102 222 Kan. 637, 567 P.2d 851 (1977).
103 107 Kan. 661, 193 P. 366 (1920), overmled in part, Finley v. McClure, 222 Kan. 637, 567
P.2d 851 (1977).
104 Finley v. McClure, 222 Kan. 637, 642, 567 P.2d 851, 855 (1977). The issue in the case
was whether, when a life tenant as landlord leases land pursuant to a crop-share lease and
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these decisions indicate, some courts have been willing to recognize
dies before the crop is harvested, the life tenant's estate or the remainderman is entitled to the
landlord's share of the crops when divided. As a consequence of recognizing the landlord's
inchoate interest in the crops attaching after planting, the court held that the landlord's share
of the crop belonged to the landlord life tenant's estate. But see York v. Jackson (In re Estate
of North), 320 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), where the court held that under similar
circumstances, the landlord's share belonged to the remainderman.
In some states, the landlord's share will be apportioned between the life tenant's estate
and the remainderman. For example, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-217 (1983) provides:
When a tenant for life demises any lands and dies on or after the day when any rent
becomes due and payable, his or her executor or administrator may recover from
the subtenant the whole rent due, but if such tenant for life dies, before the day
when any rent is to become due, his or her executor or administrator may recover
the proportion of rent which accrued before his or her death, and the remainder-
man shall recover for the residue.
This statute has been applied to crop-share rentals. See Wilson v. Hagey, 251111. 452, 96 N.E.
277 (1911); Ralston Purina Co. v. Killam, 10 11. App. 3d 397, 293 N.E.2d 750 (1973). For
other cases where rent apportionment statutes have been applied to crop-share rentals, see
Silveira v. Ohm, 33 Cal. 2d 272, 201 P.2d 387 (1949); Shintaffer v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust &
Say. Ass'n, 216 Cal. 243, 13 P.2d 668 (1932); Ferguson v. Sullivan, 58 Idaho 428, 74 P.2d 183
(1937).
The application of the Illinois statute and similar state laws to crop-share rentals raises
questions about the accrual of rent under a crop-share lease, under which rent is usually due
and payable only after the crop has been harvested. In Silveira v. Ohm, 33 Cal. 2d 272, 201
P.2d 387 (1949), the court applied the California rent apportionment statute to a crop-share
rental. The statute provided that: "When the hiring of a thing is terminated before the time
originally agreed upon, the hirer must pay the due proportion of the hire for such use as he
has actually made of the thing, unless such use is merely nominal, and of no benefit to him."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1935 (West 1954). The Silveira court explained:
There is no greater difficulty in apportioning rent payable in crops than in
apportioning rent payable in money. The essential problem in either case is to de-
termine the proportion of the agreed rent that the expired portion of the rental
period bears to the entire period. It is true that the crops may never mature or may
be destroyed without the fault of either party, or market conditions may render
them of little value. . . . Once crops have been harvested, however, as in the pres-
ent case, the amount of rent agreed upon for the year's use of the land can be readily
ascertained by determining the amount of the crops and computing the lessor's pro-
portionate share according to the expired portion of the rental period, as in the case
of rent payable in money.
33 Cal. 2d at 276-77, 201 P.2d at 390. Thus, the court appeared to assume that rent under a
crop-share lease accrues daily throughout the entire term of the lease.
The same approach has been used by Illinois courts when applying the Illinois statute to
crop-share rentals. In Wilson v. Hagey, 251 Ill. 452, 96 N.E. 277 (1911), the landlord, who
held a life estate in 110 acres of farmland, entered into a crop-share lease for the land. The
term of the lease ran from March 1, 1909 to March 1, 1910. On May 24, 1909, the landlord
died. The court apportioned the proceeds from the sale of the landlord's share of the crops
according to the Illinois statute, with 85/365 of the proceeds going to the landlord's estate
and 280/365 of the proceeds going to the remaindermen.
In Ralston Purina Co. v. Killam, 10 Ill. App. 3d 397, 293 N.E.2d 750 (1973), the land-
lord, possessing a life estate in 65 acres of farmland, leased the land on a yearly crop-sharing
basis beginning on March 1, 1969. The landlord died on August 12, 1969. Prior to her death,
the landlord paid $152.15 for her share of the fertilizer used in producing the crop. The
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that landlords enjoy a property interest in crops grown pursuant to a
crop-share lease prior to the crops' division, and that the interest at-
taches after planting.
When state law does not hold that every contract to farm on
shares creates a tenancy in common in the crops, courts are reluctant
to recognize that the cropper has a property interest in the crops
remaindermen paid the 1969 real estate taxes on the land, which amounted to $714.12. The
court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, which had provided:
[I]nasmuch as the Life Tenant had lived 164 days of the lease period,.., the Estate
of the Life Tenant was entitled to receive 164/365 of the landlord's share of the 1969
crop money, plus 201/365 of the fertilizer expenses advanced by the Life Tenant
during her lifetime, less 164/365 of the 1969 real estate taxes paid by the Remain-
dermen, and. . . the Remaindermen were entitled to receive 201/365 of the land-
lord's share of the crops, less 201/365 of the fertilizer costs paid by the Life Tenant,
plus 164/365 of the 1969 taxes so paid by the Remaindermen.
Id at 399, 293 N.E.2d at 752.
Illinois courts have apparently also assumed that, even though rent under a crop-share
lease is usually not due and payable until after the crop has been harvested, the rent accrues
on a daily basis throughout the entire lease term. The court in Silveira v. Ohm, 33 Cal. 2d
272, 201 P.2d 387 (1949), reasoned that once the landlord's share of the crop had been ascer-
tained after harvest, crop-share rentals can be apportioned in the same way as cash rentals.
The application of apportionment statutes to cash farm leases where the cash rent is due and
payable after the tenant has harvested and sold the crops, however, also raises questions about
the accrual of rent. If the cash farm lease calls for periodic payments of rent throughout the
entire lease term, then the rent accrues as each payment becomes due and payable. But both
in the situation of crop-share rentals and cash rentals that become due and payable after
harvest, the assumption of the courts that the rent accrues daily throughout the entire lease
term may be open to question. Although this system usually reaches fair results, other inter-
pretations are possible.
One possibility is that the rent does not accrue until it becomes due and payable after
harvest. This interpretation would prevent the application of apportionment statutes to crop-
share rentals and cash rentals that become due and payable after harvest, unless the event
that triggers the apportionment occurs after the date that the rent becomes due or payable.
Another, but less workable, possibility is that the rent begins to accrue when the crops
are planted, and thereafter accrues on a daily basis until the date after harvest when the rent
becomes due and payable. Although farm leases are generally for a 12 month term, both
parties are aware that the tenant is primarily concerned with renting the land for the produc-
tive period between planting and harvest. Furthermore, both parties are aware that the ten-
ant's ability to pay the rent depends on growing and harvesting the crops, directly in the case
of a crop-share lease and indirectly in the case of a cash lease, where the tenant will pay the
rent from the proceeds from the sale of the crops. Thus a court could hold that the rent
accrues daily during the period when the land is productive, and not throughout the entire
lease term. This accrual system, however, ignores the farmer's actions prior to the growing
season (such as fall plowing and fertilizer application) that contribute directly to crop produc-
tion, and probably would create injustice in some circumstances. In effect, it would render
several months (the period between harvest and spring farming) of ownership valueless, for
the land would produce no income to its owner.
Regardless of the rule adopted to govern the accrual of rent due and payable after har-
vest, however, the court should recognize the existence of this issue and not just assume that
rent accrues daily throughout the entire lease term. For other situations where the acrual
issue arises, see notes 120, 147, and 261 infia.
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before division. If the cropper has no transferable interest in the
crops before division, the cropper's creditors cannot seize the crops. 0 5
At least one court, however, has indicated that a cropper has a mort-
gagable interest in the crops. 06
Courts holding that every contract to farm on shares creates a
tenancy in common in the crops have recognized property interests
prior to division in the landlord under a crop-share lease, 0 7 and in
the cropper under a cropper contract.'0 8 This conclusion follows
from the nature of a tenancy in common in the crops, which has been
described as "a co-ownership . . . created between the landowner
and the grower in all crops grown."' 0 9 The same conclusion should
follow whenever a court finds that a particular contract to farm on
shares creates a tenancy in common in crops, even if the court does
not hold that all such contracts to farm on shares create tenancies in
common.110
The recognition that both the crop-share landlord and the crop-
per have property interests in the crops before division is both the
best interpretation of the parties' probable intent and the best policy.
The landlord under a crop-share lease provides the land on which
the crops are grown, a share of the necessary supplies, and often some
degree of management. The cropper under a cropper contract pro-
vides all the labor to grow the crops; he can also provide a share of
supplies and, under some contracts, some management of the opera-
tion. Additionally, the parties have contracted in advance to split
the crops that result from their joint efforts. Under these circum-
stances each party surely intends to enjoy a property interest in the
crops before division.
Recognition of a property interest in the landlord and the crop-
per before division also comports with modern agricultural financing
practices. "', In many instances the landlord or cropper may need to
105 See Braizier v. Ansley, 33 N.C. 12 (1850); Atwood v. Freund, 219 Wis. 358, 263 N.W.
180 (1935).
106 See Bourland v. McKnight & Bros., 79 Ark. 427, 96 S.W. 179 (1906).
107 See Underhill v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 15 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1926); Devereaux
Mortgage Co. v. Walker, 46 Idaho 431, 268 P. 37 (1928).
108 See First State Bank v. St. Anthony & Dakota Elevator Co., 64 N.D. 138, 250 N.W. 778
(1933).
109 Devereaux, 46 Idaho at 435, 268 P. at 38.
110 See text accompanying notes 36-43 sufpra.
111 For a discussion of the problems involved when a landlord puts up his share of grow-
ing crops as collateral for a loan, see Meyer, "Crops" as Co/lateral, supra note 81, at 10. Meyer
assumes that the landlord has an interest in the crop after planting that he can sell or use for
collateral.
[1984-]
FARM LEASE IN BANKRUPTCY
use his share of the crops as collateral to finance obligations under
the contract. If courts refuse to recognize any property interest in the
crops before division, banks will be reluctant to accept shares of the
crops as collateral, and farm operations may encounter difficulty in
securing necessary sources of financing.
Finally, the recognition of a property interest in the crops before
division does not necessarily conflict with decisions holding that the
tenant under a crop-share lease, and the landowner under a cropper
contract, have title to the crops until division. As previously men-
tioned, the courts created these rules in cases regarding conversion of
crops grown pursuant to contracts to farm on shares. 112 Nevertheless,
to avoid conflict with this precedent courts might prefer to follow the
lead of FKnW v. McClure1 3 and hold that the landlord's or cropper's
interest is inchoate and does not ripen into a right of possession until
division. This rule would eliminate the possibility that the landlord,
the cropper, or their creditors, particularly lenders who have taken a
security interest in the crops, could seize the crops before division.
C. Alternative Dispositions of Crops and Livestock Raised Pursuant to
.Farm Leases
When one of the parties to the agreement enters bankruptcy, the
disposition of crops and livestock raised pursuant to a farm lease de-
pends on the relationship the lease creates, the resulting property in-
terests in the crops and livestock, which party (landowner or farmer)
files" for bankruptcy, and the actions of the nondebtor party. Several
Bankruptcy Code provisions are critical to this analysis.
With several exceptions, section 365 gives the trustee authority
to assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, subject to court approval. 14 In a Chapter 7 liquidation case,
if the trustee does not assume or reject an executory contract or
unexpired lease within sixty days after the order for relief, or within
an additional sixty-day period, the contract or lease is deemed re-
jected."15 But in a Chapter 11 reorganization or a Chapter 13 adjust-
ment of debts, the debtor's executory contract or unexpired lease
may be assumed or rejected at any time before the confirmation of a
112 See text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
113 222 Kan. 637, 567 P.2d 851 (1977).
114 For a discussion of the assumption or rejection of farm leases pursuant to § 365, see
notes 173-254 infla and accompanying text. Section 1107 also gives the debtor in possession in
a Chapter 11 reorganization the authority to assume or reject executory contracts and
unexpired leases.
115 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1982). The court must approve the additional 60 day period.
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plan." 6 The court, however, on request of any party to the contract
or lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified period
of time whether to assume or reject the contract or lease. 1 7
Nondebtor parties to farm leases may need to petition the court to
order assumption or rejection within a specified period of time to
protect their share of the crops or livestock.
1. Tenant bankruptcy under a crop-share lease
If a tenant in a crop-share lease enters bankruptcy at any time
between planting and division, the tenant's interest in the crops
passes to his estate pursuant to section 541. Either the tenant, as
debtor in possession, or the trustee will be able to avoid any statutory
lien for rent in the crops under section 545(3).118 If, according to the
relevant state law, the landlord under a crop-share lease has no prop-
erty interest in the crops before division, the estate has full ownership
of the crops until division. Under section 363, the debtor in posses-
sion would be able to sell the crops for the estate at any time before
division of the crops without seeking the landlord's consent. 19
Even if the landlord takes no action, he will receive some protec-
tion for his share of the crops if the debtor in possession sells the
crops. Under sections 507(a)(1) and 503(b)(1)(A), the landlord will
have an administrative expense priority claim for rent that accrues
during the administration of the bankruptcy estate.' 20 As to the rent
that accrues before bankruptcy, the landlord will be a general un-
secured creditor. 12' If the tenant enters bankruptcy shortly before
harvest and then immediately sells the crops, a large portion of the
landlord's rent could be a general unsecured debt. In addition, the
landlord must not make the mistake of concluding that a debtor in
possession who continues to handle the farm operation has assumed
the contract. The fact that a debtor in possession continues to per-
form under a lease and does not reject it after a reasonable time does
not mean the lease is assumed, for assumption requires an express
116 11 U.S.C. §365(d)(2) (1982).
117 Id
118 See text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
119 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(o(2) (1982).
120 See text accompanying notes 262-67 infta (regarding an administrative priority for
rent). Allowance of an administrative priority expense claim for the rent that accrues during
administration of the tenant's estate again raises questions about the accrual of rent under a
crop-share lease, under which rent is usually due and payable after the crop has been har-
vested. For a discussion of the possible alternatives, see note 104 Supra.
121 See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982). The landlora with a security interest in the crops may
enjoy a somewhat more advantageous position. See text accompanying notes 73-86 supra.
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court order.122
Although the Code offers two forms of protection in this area,
the landlord must take the initiative to assert them. First, pursuant
to section 365(d)(2) the landlord can request the court to order the
trustee or debtor in possession to assume or reject the crop-share lease
within a specified period of time. 123 If the debtor in possession as-
sumes the lease, he will be bound by its terms and must make the
landlord's share of the crops available at division.124 If the debtor in
possession rejects the crop-share lease or a trustee has been appointed
who cannot assume the lease, 125 this rejection is considered a breach
of the lease immediately before the date of the bankruptcy peti-
tion.126 If the tenant does not voluntarily vacate the leased premises
after rejection, the landlord can pursue state law remedies to protect
himself. 27 Both when the tenant is forced to give up possession
under state law and when the tenant voluntarily yields possession,
the landlord must deliver the remainder of the tenant's share of the
crops to the estate, after taking his own share and deducting enough
from the tenant's share to pay for any expenses incurred in tending
and harvesting the crops after the landlord regained possession. 28
The landlord is also protected by section 363(e), 29 which re-
quires the debtor in possession to give adequate protection to a party
with an interest in property used, sold, or leased. The landlord can
request adequate protection for the debtor's use of the land during
the period between the bankruptcy filing and assumption or rejec-
tion. This right is independent of the landlord's administrative prior-
122 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03[1] (L. King 15th ed. 1979)., When the
debtor in possession sells all the crops just before harvest, the landlord who has wrongly con-
cluded that the contract was assumed may discover that he is limited to an administrative
expense priority claim for rent accruing during administration and an unsecured claim for
rent that accrued before bankruptcy.
123 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
124 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, 365.03[2].
125 Because of § 365(c), the trustee cannot assume the crop-share lease if the court classi-
fies it as a personal service contract. See text accompanying notes 201-10 infra, for a discus-
sion of this issue.
126 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1982).
127 For example, the landlord could bring an action to regain possession because of de-
fault. Se, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10, §§ 6-101 to -150 (ejectment), 9-101 to -116 (forcible
entry and detainer) (1983).
128 Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-318 (1983), which provides that when a tenant
abandons crops which have not fully matured, the landlord may cultivate and harvest the
crops, sell them, and apply the proceeds to pay the rent and to compensate the landlord for
his labor and expenses.
129 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1982).
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ity claim. 30
When state law grants the landlord a property interest in the
crops before division, he should be fully protected when the tenant
enters bankruptcy. Only the tenant's interest in the crops will pass to
the estate in bankruptcy, and the landlord will retain his interest. In
Underhill v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. ,131 landlord and tenant entered
into a crop-share lease under which the landlord was to receive one-
third of all wheat grown. After the tenant filed for bankruptcy, the
trustee completed threshing and marketing, with some assistance
from a bank with a chattel mortgage on the tenant's interest in the
crops. The trustee and the bank then refused to pay the landlord his
one-third interest in the wheat, arguing that the wheat belonged to
the tenant's estate. Overruling the bankruptcy referee, the district
court held that the agreement was a lease, that the landlord must
receive a portion of the wheat as rent, that the landlord acquired no
lien on or title to any part of the wheat, and that his rights were those
of a general creditor. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the lease created a tenancy in
common in the crops. The landlord therefore owned an undivided
one-third interest in the wheat, and only the tenant's interest passed
to the estate in bankruptcy.
As Underhill suggests, in a state where landlords have property
rights in crops before division, the landlord will retain his interest in
the crops when the tenant enters bankruptcy, and Bankruptcy Code
section 363( (2) will prevent the debtor in possession from selling the
crops for the estate without the landlord's consent. 132
The landlord should also be fully protected if he has taken a
consensual lien for rent in the crops and the lien has been perfected
according to the requirements of Article 9 of the U.C.C. 133 Because
the landlord's interest is in the form of a lien, the debtor in possession
will be able to sell all the crops for the estate without obtaining the
landlord's consent as long as the price at which the crops are to be
130 See Bienenstock, The Bankruptey Code and Landlords and Tenants, LEGAL NOTES & VIEW-
POINTS Q., Nov. 1982, at 9, 24-25. Section 361 specifies that adequate protection may be
provided by making periodic cash payments to the nondebtor, providing the nondebtor with
an additional or replacement lien, or granting other relief to assure the nondebtor party of the
"indubitable equivalent" of his interest in the property. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982). In practice,
however, the landlord's request for adequate protection often forces the debtor in possession
into an immediate assumption of the crop-share lease.
131 15 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1926).
132 See 11 U.S.C. §363()(2) (1982).
133 This procedure prevents the debtor in possession from avoiding the lien under
§ 545(2).
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sold is greater than the aggregate value of the lien.134 Under section
363(e), however, the landlord can demand adequate protection for
his lien in the crops. 13 5 This protection could take the form of a lien
on the proceeds of the sale.
2. Landlord bankruptcy under a crop-share lease
When a landlord enters bankruptcy, the tenant usually contin-
ues to pay rent under the lease and the rent is administered as an
asset of the landlord's estate. 36 But either the trustee or the landlord
as debtor in possession has the authority to reject the lease under
section 365.'1 7 When the landlord enters bankruptcy during the
growing season, the tenant will often continue to farm the leased
premises, making the landlord's share available to the estate in bank-
ruptcy after division.
Where state law grants the landlord an interest in the crops
before division, this interest will pass to the landlord's estate, even if
the interest is inchoate. 138 The House and Senate committee reports
clearly state that the definition of property that passes to the debtor's
estate under section 541 is broad and "includes all kinds of. . .tan-
gible or intangible property."' 39 Yet the fact that the landlord's in-
terest passes to his estate in bankruptcy should not affect the tenant,
because the landlord is not entitled to possess his share of the crop
until division, and because neither the landlord as debtor in posses-
sion nor the landlord's trustee can sell all the crops without the ten-
ant's consent.
If the landlord as debtor in possession does reject the lease after
entering bankruptcy, section 365(h)(1) allows the tenant the option
of treating the lease as terminated, or remaining in possession for the
remainder of the lease term. 4° If the tenant chooses to remain in
possession, the landlord will not have to comply with any affirmative
lease covenants, such as those requiring him to furnish the tenant
with farm inputs.14 ' In many cases the tenant will elect to remain in
possession, but in some situations the tenant will yield possession be-
134 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(3) (1982).
135 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1982).
136 See 2 COLuER ON BANKRUPTcY, supra note 122, 365.09.
137 Id
138 See text accompanying notes 100-04 supra.
139 H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 367, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6323; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5868.
140 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1982).
141 For a discussion of this issue, see text accompanying notes 258-61 infra.
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cause he lacks the financial resources to purchase supplies that the
landlord need no longer furnish. 142
Normally, when a tenant yields possession after rejection of a
lease his only remedy is an unsecured claim for damages.143 Under a
crop-share lease, however, the tenant has a property interest in the
crops prior to division which he should not lose when he vacates the
leased premises because of the debtor in possession's rejection. The
142 The doctrine of emblements may apply to the situation where the tenant must leave
premises leased pursuant to a crop-share lease because the debtor in possession rejected the
lease. According to the court in Dinwiddie v. Jordan, 228 S.W. 126, 127 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921):
The doctrine of emblements is the common-law right of tenant, whose lease of
uncertain duration has been terminated without his fault and without previous
knowledge upon his part, to enter upon the leased premises to cultivate, harvest,
and remove the crops planted by him before the termination of the lease.
This common-law right could be classified as a type of tenant "property interest" in the crops
that the bankruptcy court should respect. An argument can be made that the doctrine does
not always apply when a tenant's lease is rejected in bankruptcy, because the doctrine re-
quires that the tenant's farm lease be of uncertain duration when entered-for example, a
lease made by a life tenant landlord or a year-to-year lease. Sometimes the farm lease that is
terminated when the landlord enters bankruptcy and rejects the lease is a lease for a specified
term, rather than for uncertain duration.
A strong argument can be made, however, that the doctrine of emblements should apply
both when the lease is of uncertain duration and when a lease for a term certain is terminated
before the end of the lease period through no fault of the tenant. The purpose of the doctrine
is to protect against hardships that may result from the unexpected termination of a crop-
share lease. See Miller v. Gray, 136 Tex. 196, 149 S.W.2d 582 (1941). The same hardships
will result whether the lease was originally for an uncertain duration or for a fixed term and
prematurely terminated. The court in James v. Ritter, 206 II. App. 487 (1917), explained the
reason for the requirement that the lease be of uncertain duration: "If his [the tenant's] term
is certain and does not depend upon a contingency, so that at the time he sows the crop he
may know that his term will not continue until he shall have reaped it, he will not be entitled
to it as emblements." Id at 491. In the situation where the tenant yields possession after the
trustee or the landlord as debtor in possession rejects the lease, the tenant could not have
known when he planted the crops that the lease would be terminated before harvest. The
tenant's loss of possession because of the rejection of the lease in bankruptcy is clearly the type
of situation to which the doctrine of emblements was meant to apply. The Oregon statute on
emblements provides that under any farm lease, the tenant has free access to the leased prem-
ises, after the termination of the lease, to cultivate and harvest any crop planted before service
of the notice to quit. See OR. REV. STAT. § 91.230 (1981). This statute would likely apply in
the bankruptcy situation.
Although theoretical arguments exist to support the application of emblements in bank-
ruptcy, the tenant can obtain little benefit from the doctrine of emblements that he could not
also obtain by electing under § 365(h)(1) to remain in possession after the rejection of the
lease. All that the tenant obtains under the doctrine of emblements is a right of access to
cultivate and harvest the crops, whereas if he refuses the rejection, he remains in full posses-
sion of the leased premises. In some circumstances, the less comprehensive right obtained
through emblements may be preferred. Financial problems forcing the tenant to yield posses-
sion after rejection of the lease might in some circumstances also prevent him from using the
doctrine of emblements.
143 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
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tenant should still be entitled to his share of the crops, or the pro-
ceeds from their sale, minus any expenses saved because of rejec-
tion. 14 This policy will undoubtedly dissuade many landlords from
rejecting crop-share leases, unless they are certain they can run the
operation more productively and economically than the tenant.
When the tenant elects under section 365 (h) (2) to remain in pos-
session despite the landlord's rejection of the crop-share lease, he is
protected to some extent from the rejection of the landlord's affirma-
tive covenants. Section 365(h)(2) allows the debtor to offset any
damages that occur after the rejection against the rent due after re-
jection.145 As for the damages that occur before rejection of the lease,
the tenant is limited to an unsecured claim.
3. Landowner bankruptcy under a cropper contract
When the landowner under a cropper contract enters bank-
ruptcy, his interest in the crops passes to his estate. If, under state
law, the cropper has no property interest in the crops until after divi-
sion, the landowner's estate will have full ownership of the crops un-
til division. At any time prior to division, then, the landowner as
debtor in possession would be able to sell all the crops for the estate
under section 363 without seeking the cropper's consent. Because the
landowner always divides the crops under a cropper contract, the
landowner as debtor in possession will always be able to sell all the
crops for the estate if he enters bankruptcy before division.
The cropper will not be totally unprotected, however. Because a
cropper is considered an employee who receives a share of the crop as
wages, the cropper will have a priority claim of up to $2000 for the
portion of the crop representing wages due before bankruptcy.146
Additionally, the cropper has an administrative expense priority for
the portion of the crop that represents compensation for work per-
formed after bankruptcy. 147 A state laborer's lien may also protect
144 See text accompanying notes 270-72 infra (regarding the tenant's damages when the
landlord breaches a crop-share lease).
145 See text accompanying notes 258-61 infra.
146 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(3) (1982).
147 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 503(b)(1)(A) (1982). Section 503(b)(1)(A) provides that an
administrative expense claim should be allowed for the costs and expenses of preserving the
estate, including wages earned after the commencement of the estate. By raising the crops to
maturity, the cropper is certainly preserving the property of the estate, and his wages are his
share of the crops.
The allowance of a priority wage claim for the cropper's wages before bankruptcy and
an administrative expense wage claim for wages during the administration raises an issue
similar to the question of when rent accrues under a crop-share lease. See note 104supra. The
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the cropper.148 For the remainder of his share of the crop, the crop-
per will have an unsecured claim under section 502. When, under
state law, the cropper has an interest in the crops prior to division, he
will be fully protected. He retains his interest in the crops when the
landowner's interest passes to the estate in bankruptcy, and section
363() (2) mandates that the debtor in possession obtain the cropper's
consent before he can sell the crops. 49
Under section 365(d)(2), the cropper can also request the court
to order the debtor in possession to assume or reject the contract
within a specified period of time. 50 If the debtor in possession as-
sumes the contract, the cropper will be assured of receiving his share
of the crops. If the debtor in possession rejects the contract, however,
the cropper cannot elect to continue to farm under the contract de-
spite the rejection, for section 365(h)(1) refers to "an unexpired lease
of real property" and permits the tenant to "remain in possession." 51
The cropper has neither a true lease nor true possession of the land
he farms pursuant to the contract. Thus, when the landowner rejects
the contract, the cropper becomes limited to the same recovery he
has when the debtor in possession sells all the crops: he enjoys a sec-
tion 507(a)(1) administrative expense priority claim for wages due
after filing and before rejection of the contract, a section 507(a)(3)
priority claim for wages due before filing, any state laborer's lien, and
an unsecured claim for the balance.
Unless the cropper is certain that the debtor in possession will
assume the contract, he may not want to risk forcing the debtor in
cropper usually receives his share of the crops as wages after harvest. Thus, the court will
have to decide if and how the cropper's wages accrue prior to the time wages become due and
payable after harvest. One alternative is that the cropper's wages do not accrue until the date
that the cropper is to receive his share of the crops, and that the cropper therefore has no right
to these wage priorities. Courts may be reluctant to adopt a solution with such harsh results.
Another alternative is that the cropper's wages begin to accrue on the date that the
cropper begins performance under the contract, and thereafter accrue daily until the date
after harvest when the cropper's share of crops becomes due and payable. In determining
when rent accrues under a crop-share lease, the court may have to determine whether the
relevant accrual period is the land's productive season or the entire lease term. Id Because
the cropper is only an employee and does not have possession of the land he farms, the crop-
per's wages should accrue only during the period he is actually working on the land.
148 See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
149 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(2) (1982).
150 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
151 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1982). The House and Senate committee reports make it clear
that the right to remain in possession after rejection refers only to the holders of estates in
land. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 359, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6315; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 60, reprinttedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5846.
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possession to assume or reject within a specified period of time. After
the bankruptcy filing, the cropper has an administrative expense pri-
ority claim for the portion of the crop that represents wages that ac-
crued from the filing to rejection of the contract. After rejection, the
cropper only has an unsecured claim for the rest of his share of the
crop, with the exception of the $2000 wage priority claim for the
portion of the crop that represents wages accrued before filing. If the
debtor in possession allows the cropper to continue to perform, but
does not formally assume the contract, the cropper would be fairly
well protected. On the other hand, if the landowner rejects the con-
tract, the cropper may be limited to an unsecured claim for a large
portion of his crop share. When a landowner under a cropper con-
tract enters bankruptcy, then, he is likely to be the party most con-
cerned with promptly rejecting the executory contract.
When the debtor in possession rejects the cropper contract and
state law grants the cropper an interest in the crops before division,
the cropper's interest should be fully protected. Like the tenant
under a rejected crop-share lease, the cropper should not lose his in-
terest in the crops when the lease is rejected. Instead, the cropper
should receive his share of the crops, or the proceeds from the sale of
the crops, less expenses saved because of rejection. 5 2
4. Cropper bankruptcy under a cropper contract
A bankrupt cropper and his creditors face a difficult situation;
the cropper can only hope that the landowner will ignore the bank-
ruptcy and allow him to continue to farm so that his share of crops
will pass to his estate after division.153 Even when state law gives the
cropper an interest in the crops before division, his position remains
weak. This interest will pass to the cropper's estate, but it does not
entitle the estate to possession of the crops. Nor does it entitle the
cropper, as debtor in possession, to sell the crops under section 363
without the landowner's consent, because the landowner also has an
interest in the crops.
152 See text accompanying notes 271-72 infra (regarding the cropper's damages when the
landowner breaches a cropper contract).
153 The bankrupt estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982). It includes proceeds
from property of the estate, except for earnings from services performed by the debtor after
the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1982).
Thus, the post-bankruptcy earnings of the debtor would not normally be part of the
estate. This distinction, which applies in situations other than that of cropper bankruptcy,
may require difficult apportionment.
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In some instances the landowner will undoubtedly exercise his
section 363(d)(2) right to force the cropper-debtor in possession to
assume or reject the contract within a specified period of time. One
reason for this move might be the landowner's desire to ensure that
the cropper will continue to work during the harvest season, when it
might be difficult to find other farm labor. Another motivation
might be the landowner's dissatisfaction with the cropper's perform-
ance. If a trustee has been appointed in the case, it is likely that he
cannot assume the contract because it involves personal services. 154
After rejection, the cropper will be considered to have breached the
lease immediately before the bankruptcy filing, and the landowner
will be able to contract with a different cropper to farm the land.1 55
When a cropper's trustee must reject the contract, the cropper's
estate may still receive some credit for the cropper's contract per-
formance. After taking his share of the crops, plus the value of the
extra expenses that the cropper's breach occasioned, the landowner
must make the rest of the cropper's share available to the cropper's
estate.
5. Bankruptcy under the livestock-share lease
As previously mentioned, the bankruptcy court might interpret
a livestock-share lease as a partnership. 15 6 Bankruptcy treatment of
crops grown and livestock raised pursuant to a livestock-share lease
depends, in part, on the characterization of the lease.
a. Livestock-share lease as partnership
If the court decides that the lease creates a partnership, it will
look to state law to ascertain the bankrupt partner's interests in the
crops and livestock. In his treatise on partnership, Rowley summa-
rized the results of a partner's bankruptcy under the Uniform Part-
nership Act:
[T]he bankruptcy of a partner dissolves the firm, and the non-
bankrupt partners have the right to wind up. The non-bankrupt
partners, after having wound up the affairs of the partnership,
and upon accounting to the trustee, will turn over to the trustee
in bankruptcy of the estate of the individual bankrupt partner
the share of the assets belonging to the bankrupt partner. There
will be such a share only if the claims of all creditors of the
partnership firm have been fully satisfied. If creditors have not
154 See text accompanying notes 201-06 infra.
155 11 U.S.C. §365(g)(1) (1982).
156 See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
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been fully satisfied those with provable claims may file their
proofs of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. 157
This procedure is clearly different from the bankruptcy of either
party under a crop-share lease or cropper contract.
When a livestock-share lease is interpreted to create a partner-
ship, the bankrupt partner's share of the surplus is distributed to his
estate after the partnership liabilties are satisfied. In some cases, little
surplus will remain regardless of whether the debtor is landowner or
farmer. Any security interests that the partners created in crops or
livestock, and partnership liabilities for seed, equipment, fertilizer,
and other chemicals must be satisfied before distribution of surplus
can be made. If the proceeds from crops, livestock, and other prop-
erty do not satisfy these liabilities, the bankrupt partner's estate will
receive nothing from the partnership, but instead will face additional
claims, either from the nonbankrupt partner or partners for contri-
bution, or directly from partnership creditors. On the other hand,
when the bankrupt partner has already paid for the livestock, seed,
cattle, equipment, fertilizer, or other chemicals that he contributed
to the partnership, and the proceeds from the sale of the partnership
assets do not compensate him for these contributions, the bankrupt
partner's trustee can bring a contribution action against the
nonbankrupt partners for their proportionate share of the partner-
ship's liability to the bankrupt partner. 158
b. Livestock-share lease as tenanq,
When the court decides that a livestock-share lease creates a
landlord-tenant relationship, the bankruptcy treatment of the crops
grown pursuant to the lease is different from the treatment of the
livestock. Because the agreement for the crops in a livestock-share
lea e is generally the same as in an ordinary crop-share lease, the
bankruptcy treatment of the crops should also be similar. As in a
crop-share lease, the treatment will depend on whether state law
gives the landlord an interest in the crops before division. 159
The situation is different, however, with regard to the livestock.
Under some livestock-share leases, each party holds title individually
to one-half of the livestock. Under others, each party owns an undi-
vided one-half interest in all the livestock. If each party to the lease
owns one-half of the livestock, the bankruptcy of a party should have
157 2 R. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP § 46.11 (2d ed. 1960) (citations omitted).
158 See generally UPA §§ 2, 18, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40.
159 See text accompanying notes 118-45 supra.
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little impact on the ownership of the livestock. But if each party has
an undivided one-half interest in the livestock, the interest of the
bankrupt party passes to his estate. Because the nonbankrupt party
has an interest in the livestock, the debtor in possession cannot sell
the livestock for his estate under section 363 unless the nondebtor
consents. 160 Moreover, neither landlord nor tenant rejection of the
livestock-share lease after bankruptcy should affect livestock owner-
ship. For example, when a tenant under a crop-share lease enters
bankruptcy and thereafter rejects the lease, the landlord will re-enter
the leased premises, finish cultivating and harvesting the crops, and
turn over to the tenant's estate only those crops remaining after the
landlord has taken his share plus the expenses incurred in cultivating
and harvesting the crops. 61 When the tenant under a livestock-share
lease enters bankruptcy and his trustee must reject the lease, 62 the
landlord will be in the same position as the crop-share landlord as to
the crops. But because ownership of the livestock is separate from
possession of the land on which the livestock operation is located, the
landlord will retain only his undivided one-half interest in the
livestock.
If the tenant rejects the lease, someone must tend the livestock
until the animals are ready for market. When the landlord tends the
livestock, the expenses he incurs actually lower the rent he receives
by decreasing the profit included in his share of the proceeds. The
landlord should therefore have a claim against the tenant's estate for
expenses incurred in tending the livestock after the trustee's rejection.
For one-half of these expenses, the landlord should assert an adminis-
trative expense priority claim under section 507(a)(1), because the
expenses were necessary to preserve the tenant's one-half interest in
the livestock.' 63
Clearly, the crops and livestock will be treated differently in
bankruptcy, depending on whether the livestock-share lease creates a
partnership or a landlord-tenant relationship. If the arrangement is
a partnership, the bankrupt partner's estate will receive only the pro-
ceeds from the partnership liquidation remaining after all partner-
160 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(2) (1982); see also text accompanying notes 119, 142, and 149.
161 See text accompanying note 130 supra.
162 The tenant under a livestock-share lease, just like the tenant under a crop-share lease,
will almost always prefer either to assume the lease or to continue to perform under the lease
without assuming or rejecting it. As in the case of the crop-share lease, however, if a trustee is
appointed who cannot assume the lease, and the landlord forces the tenant to assume or
reject, the trustee will have to reject the lease. See text accompanying notes 201-06 infra.
163 See II U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982).
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ship liabilities have been satisfied. The estate may be liable for
partnership debts that nonbankrupt partners have incurred and may
be able to collect contributions from the nonbankrupt partners. On
the other hand, if the arrangement is a landlord-tenant relationship,
bankruptcy should not affect the parties' ownership interests in the
livestock. The result as to the crops will depend on which party en-
ters bankruptcy, as well as the parties' property rights in the crops
under state law.
6. The cash lease
When a party under a cash farm lease enters bankruptcy, the
court rarely faces difficulties concerning the crops. If the tenant, as
debtor in possession, continues to farm the leased premises after
filing, an administrative expense priority claim under section
507(a) (1) will protect the landlord's portion of the cash rent that ac-
crued after bankruptcy. 164 He will also have an unsecured claim
under section 502 for the portion of cash rent that accrued before
filing. 165 Under section 365(d)(2), the landlord has the power to re-
quest the court to order the trustee or the debtor in possession to
assume or reject the cash lease within a specified period of time. 66
But if a trustee has been appointed, the trustee may not be able to
assume the cash lease if the court holds that it constitutes a personal
service contract.' 67 The debtor in possession will almost always as-
sume the lease, unless he is certain that the proceeds from the sale of
the crops will not exceed the rent owed the landlord. When the
trustee or debtor in possession does assume the lease, he is obligated
to pay the cash rent pursuant to the terms of the lease. 68
In the rare event that the trustee or debtor in possession rejects
the lease, the landlord can re-enter the leased premises. He will have
an administrative expense priority claim under section 507(a)(1) for
the portion of the cash rent that accrued after filing and before rejec-
tion of the lease.' 69 He will also have an unsecured claim for rent
that accrued before filing. In addition, he will have possession of the
farmland and growing crops. Proceeds from the sale of these crops
should be applied first toward expenses the landlord incurred in
tending, harvesting, and marketing the crops, and then toward the
164 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982).
165 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
166 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
167 See note 210 infra.
168 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, supra note 122, 365.03[2].
169 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982).
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landlord's claim for rent. Any remaining proceeds should be remit-
ted to the tenant's estate.
When the landlord under a cash lease enters bankruptcy, the
tenant will generally continue to farm the leased premises and pay
the rent due to the landlord's estate. If the landlord as debtor- in
possession decides to reject the lease, the tenant will almost always
elect, under section 365(h) (1), to remain in possession despite the re-
jection, unless he is certain that the profit from the sale of the crops
will not exceed the cash rent due under the lease. 170 If the tenant
does yield possession under these circumstances, he will not have a
claim for damages, because a tenant's damages for landlord's breach
of a cash lease are the profits he would have received from the sale of
the crops, less the cash rent reserved under the lease and any other
expenses saved, 171 which in this case would be zero. After rejection,
the debtor in possession will be able to re-enter the leased premises
and cultivate, harvest, and market the crops.172
III. Assumption of Farm Leases and Cropper Contracts
A. Mechanics of Assuming and Assigning
1. Assumption without default
As the discussion above indicates, section 365 gives the trustee
the power, subject to court approval, to assume or reject any execu-
tory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, and section 1107 gives
the same power to a debtor in possession under Chapter 11.173 The
Code does not define the terms "executory contract" and "unexpired
lease," but the House and Senate Committee reports explain that
"[t]hough there is no precise definition of what contracts are execu-
tory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains
due to some extent on both sides."' 174 Moreover, Professor Vern
170 Unlike the tenant under a crop-share lease, who usually receives supplies from the
landlord (and in losing them at rejection may be forced to yield possession), the tenant under
a cash lease does not normally receive supplies from the landlord. Therefore, his ability to
farm the leased premises should not be financially impaired if the debtor in possession rejects
the lease. The only condition that would lead the tenant to yield possession if the landlord
rejected (namely, the fact that profit from the sale of the crop would probably not exceed rent
due under the lease) will also lead the landlord to assume instead of reject the lease. Thus, in
practical terms, the tenant under a cash lease will probably never yield possession after rejec-
tion of the lease.
171 See text accompanying note 283 infra.
172 See text accompanying notes 125-28 supra.
173 See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra.
174 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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Countryman defined an executory contract as "a contract under
which the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to
the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to com-
plete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other. ' 175  Courts have tended to adopt the
Countryman definition. 76
Thus, when a party to a'farm lease or cropper contract enters
bankruptcy, the court's treatment of the agreement as an unexpired
lease or an executory contract will depend on whether both parties
still must fulfill substantial and material obligations. 77 Whether
lease or contract, any agreement to farm on shares should remain
unexpired or executory at least until the crops are harvested or the
livestock are raised to market weight. A cash farm lease should re-
main executory as long as the lease term has not expired.
The Bankruptcy Code limits the time in which the trustee may
assume or reject the contract or lease. As already noted, the trustee
in a Chapter 7 case generally must assume or reject an executory
contract or unexpired lease within sixty days after the order for relief.
Otherwise, the contract or lease is deemed rejected.' 78 Under Chap-
ters 11 and 13, the Code permits assumption or rejection in the plan
itself or any time before confirmation of a plan. Additionally, on
request of any party to the contract or lease, the court may set a
specific time limit.1 79 In setting the time period, courts should con-
sider that many farm leases or cropper contracts are one-year agree-
ments and that the growing season is relatively short. Moreover, if
the tenant is the debtor and he rejects the lease or contract, the land-
owner may have to find someone else to harvest the crops. In some
NEWS 5963, 6303; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5844.
175 Countryman, Executog Contracts in Bankrupty, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973).
176 See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Klinger (In re Knutson), 563 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977); In
re Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 16 Bankr. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Ohio 1982). But see In re Booth, 19
Bankr. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), which rejected the Countryman test as the sole determinant
of an executory contract in a reorganization case. In re Booth involved a contract for a deed,
and the debtor was the buyer. See Weintraub & Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: What ir an
Executor
, 
Contract? A Challenge to the Countiyman Test, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 273 (1983).
177 See In re Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 16 Bankr. at 786.
178 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1982).
179 It U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982);seealso 11 U.S.C. § 1124(b)(2) (1982). This time period
must be reasonable, see Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168, 174 (1941); Central Man-
hattan Props. v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 91 F.2d 728, 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 743
(1937); In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); and it should
depend upon the individual circumstances of each case, see In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11
F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
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instances the nondebtor will have no protection if the lease is not
assumed or rejected before division of the crops. 180
The Code does not provide the trustee with any standards for
assuming or rejecting executory contracts or unexpired leases. The
courts' most favored rule for making this determination is the "busi-
ness judgment" rule, first articulated in the Supreme Court case of
Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
R.R. Co. .181 In that decision, the Court concluded that "the question
whether a lease should be rejected and, if not, on what terms it
should be assumed is one of business judgment."'1 82 Factors that will
influence the judgment include the debtor's plans to liquidate or re-
organize, and the stage in the growing season that the debtor entered
bankruptcy. If bankruptcy occurs before or just after planting, the
debtor, whether landowner, tenant, or cropper, may face difficulty in
assuming the lease or cropper contract if he cannot provide the nec-
essary inputs. If the debtor cannot successfully reorganize without
assuming the lease or contract, he will undoubtedly make every effort
to find financing for his share of the inputs. In contrast, if bank-
ruptcy occurs shortly before harvest the lease or cropper contract is
more likely to be assumed notwithstanding whether the party plans
to liquidate. Most of the expenses have already been incurred, and
the trustee or debtor in possession will want to ensure receipt of the
debtor's share of the crops.
Significantly, once the trustee or debtor in possession assumes a
lease or a contract, he will not have to provide the nondebtor with
180 See text accompanying notes 119-22 supra.
181 318 U.S. 523 (1943). The other view is that the trustee can reject a contract or lease
only if the contract or lease in fact involves some loss or detriment to the estate. Eg., River-
city v. Herpel (n re Jackson Brewing Co.), 567 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978); American Brake
Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 122, 365.03.
182 318 U.S. at 550. The "business judgment" rule was approved more recently in Con-
trol Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979), in which the court
explained:
We believe that such a flexible test for determining when an executory contract may
be rejected, however termed (and "business judgment" is as good a label as any), is
most appropriate. For in bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee, and ultimately the
court, must exercise their discretion fairly in the interest of all who have had the
misfortune of dealing with the debtor. A rigid test, permitting rejection only where
the executory contract will cause a net loss to the debtor's estate if performed, might
work a substantial injustice in cases where it can be shown that the non-debtor
contracting party will reap substantial benefits under the contract while the debtor's
creditors are forced to make substantial compromises of their claims.
For further discussions of the business judgment rule, see 2 COLLIER IN BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 122, 365.03; Bienenstock, supra note 130, at 34.
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adequate assurance under section 365(b) if the debtor has not de-
faulted. 183 For example, if a tenant under a crop-share lease, who
was not in default, entered bankruptcy during the middle of the
growing season, he could assume the lease without giving the land-
lord adequate assurance as long as he had continued to perform his
lease obligations until the time of assumption.
2. Assumption after default
If the trustee or debtor in possession decides to assume a lease or
contract on which the debtor has defaulted, he must first comply
with the requirements of section 365(b). This section provides that at
the time of assumption, the defaulting debtor or the trustee must
either cure the default, provide adequate assurance of prompt cure,
or provide adequate assurance of prompt compensation to a
nondebtor party for any actual pecuniary loss resulting from the de-
fault. In addition, he must provide adequate assurance of future per-
formance under the contract or lease.' 84 And section 365(b) applies
in this situation regardless of whether the debtor's default occurred
before or after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. 8 5
The elements of prompt cure and adequate assurance depend on
the facts of each case. 86 In most decisions discussing adequate assur-
ance of future performance under an unexpired lease of real prop-
erty, the courts have focused on the debtor's ability to meet his
financial obligations under the lease.'8 7 Thus, in In re Lafayette Radio
Electronics Corp. ,88 the court held that the debtor-tenant's prospective
income (generated by the debtor's sublease program), the introduc-
tion of a probable merger partner for the debtor, and the viability of
the proposed sublessee's other operations gave the landlord adequate
assurance of future performance. In Seidle v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. (In re Belize Airways, Ltd ),189 adequate assurance of future
183 See n re Perretta, 6 BasNKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 1201 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980); 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCy, supra note 122, 365.04[1].
184 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1982).
185 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, supra note 122, 365.04[1].
186 See In re U.L. Radio Corp., 19 Bankr. 537, 542 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Lafayette
Radio Elecs. Corp., 9 Bankr. 993, 998 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 5
Bankr. 412, 420-21 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); Bienenstock, sura note 130, at 21. The Code
defines adequate assurance of future performance only for leases of real property in a shop-
ping center. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3) (1982).
187 But see text accompanying notes 227-38 infra, where the issue is discussed in the con-
text of how much a debtor assuming or assigning a lease may alter the lease terms.
188 9 Bankr. 993 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
189 5 Bankr. 152 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
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performance was premised on the landlord's receipt of a $75,000 se-
curity deposit, equal to approximately three month's rent. And in
the case of Zn re Sapolin Paints, Inc. ,190 the landlord was held to have
adequate assurance because the difference between the lease rent and
the prevailing rents in the area was over $1,000,000 for the remain-
der of the lease term.
A bankrupt party to a farm lease will also have the option to
cure any defaults with cash payments, while providing security de-
posits as adequate assurance of future performance. Few parties to
farm leases, however, are likely to have the financial ability to make
these arrangements. In these situations the debtor can probably best
cure a default and provide adequate assurance by agreeing to alter
the rights of the parties in the crops. For example, a debtor-landlord
who has failed to provide his share of the inputs could agree to allow
the tenant a larger share of the crops after harvest, thereby curing the
default; the additional share would permit the tenant to finance
needed inputs, and the tenant's possession of the crop until division
would provide him with adequate assurance of future performance.
The same type of agreement is feasible if a bankrupt tenant has de-
faulted on the crop-share lease. If applicable state law gives the land-
lord no interest in the crops until division, the tenant could grant the
landlord a security interest in the crops for his share. Landowners
and croppers under cropper contracts could enter similar agree-
ments. In some instances, however, this method of providing ade-
quate assurance will be unavailable because the debtor will have
granted a security interest, often to obtain a production loan, in his
share of the crops prior to entering bankruptcy.
Another provision of section 365(b) may apply when the tenant
under a crop-share lease enters bankruptcy. Section 365(b)(4) pro-
vides that if a debtor-tenant has defaulted on an unexpired lease, the
trustee or debtor in possession may not require a lessor to provide
incidental services or supplies before assumption unless the lessor is
compensated under the lease terms.19 1 Thus, when a tenant who has
defaulted on a crop-share lease enters bankruptcy, the tenant as
debtor in possession cannot require the landlord to furnish his share
of the supplies without properly compensating him. The very nature
of a crop-share lease-in which the landlord's share depends on the
190 5 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
191 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(4) (1982). According to its legislative history, this provision is in-
tended "to make clear that a debtor in possession 'may not require a lessor to supply services
or materials unless the lessor is compensated as provided in the lease'." 124 CONG. REC.
32396 (1978).
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size of the crop and is usually not paid until the crops are divided-
may pose problems for the debtor in determining how to compensate
the landlord in compliance with the lease terms. Nevertheless, the
landlord should demand section 365(b)(4) compensation if the
debtor in possession attempts to force him to provide supplies before
assuming the contract. Moreover, the statutory directive to ensure
compensation should encourage courts to fashion compensation
plans that will adequately protect the landlords.
3. Clauses prohibiting assignment and bankruptcy termination
clauses
Many leases or executory contracts contain provisions that
either prohibit assignment or terminate the agreement upon the
bankruptcy of a party. The effectiveness of a reorganization, how-
ever, may depend on the ability of the trustee or debtor in possession
to assume the lease or contract. Particularly in a farm lease situation,
the lease is critical to the business undergoing reorganization; with-
out the farmland, successful reorganization will be impossible. Rec-
ognizing the difficulties that clauses prohibiting assignment or
terminating the agreement on bankruptcy pose, the Code specifically
addresses these situations.
In general, the Code provides that executory contracts and
unexpired leases can be assigned in bankruptcy. Notwithstanding a
provision in the agreement or a relevant state statute that prohibits,
restricts, or conditions the assignment of the agreement, the trustee or
debtor in possession may assign the contract or lease under certain
circumstances. 192 First, the trustee or debtor in possession must as-
sume the agreement in accordance with the provisions of section
365.193 The assigneee of the contract or lease must provide the
nondebtor party with adequate assurance of future performance, re-
gardless of whether the debtor has defaulted.194 Assignment of a con-
tract or lease assumed under section 365 relieves both the trustee or
debtor in possession and the estate of any liability for any breach of
the contract or lease occurring after the assignment.1 95
The Code excepts personal service contracts from the general
right to assign contracts and leases. Section 365(c) provides that a
trustee may not assume or assign a personal service contract if appli-
192 See 11 U.S.C. § 365() (1982).
193 11 U.S.C. §365()(2)(A) (1982).
194 11 U.S.C. §365(0(2)(B) (1982).
195 11 U.S.C. §365(k) (1982).
[Vol. 59:598]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
cable law excuses a nondebtor party from accepting performance
from, or rendering performance to, the trustee or an assigneee. 196 But
the trustee may assume or assign such a personal service contract if
the nondebtor party consents. 197
While a trustee cannot assume a personal service contract that
falls within the prohibition of section 365(c), the debtor in possession
can assume such a contract because he is the same party with whom
the nondebtor agreed to accept or render performance. Neither the
trustee nor the debtor in possession, however, would be able to assign
that personal service contract to someone other than the original
farmer.
In addition to its provisions on assignment, the Code also states
that after the commencement of the bankruptcy case, a debtor's ex-
ecutory contract or unexpired lease may not be terminated or modi-
fied solely because of a provision in the contract or lease conditioned
on the debtor's bankruptcy. 198 Nevertheless, a contract or lease can
be terminated or modified because of a bankruptcy termination
clause if it is a personal service contract.199 The debtor or assignee
must also recognize that the breach of a bankruptcy clause after as-
sumption or assignment of an unexpired lease, and after the bank-
ruptcy case is closed, will result in a modification or termination of
the lease, pursuant to the terms of the clause. 2°°
B. The Contract to Farm on Shares: A Personal Service Contract?
The determination of whether a contract to farm on shares qual-
ifies as a personal service contract under section 365(c) becomes par-
196 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1982).
197 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(B) (1982).
198 11 U.S.c § 365(e)(1) (1982). This section lists three specific conditions'that cannot
trigger the termination or modification of the lease or contract:
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing
of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or
a custodian before such commencement.
Id
199 11 U.S.C. §365(e)(2)(A) (1982).
200 The House and Senate committee reports declare:
This subsection does not limit the application of an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause
if a new insolvency or receivership occurs after the bankruptcy case is closed. That
is, the clause is not invalidated in toto, but merely made inapplicable during the
case for the purposes of disposition of the executory contract or unexpired lease.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 349, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6305; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5845.
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ticularly significant when one of the contracting parties enters
bankruptcy. For example, if a tenant under a crop-share lease files a
Chapter 11 reorganization, assumption of the lease may be essential
for successful reorganization. If the court appoints a trustee who can-
not assume the crop-share lease because it has been classified as a
personal service contract, the tenant's attempt to reorganize could be
doomed from the start. Because the situations of the tenant and
landlord are somewhat different, the issue of whether a crop-share
lease is a personal service contract must be examined from the per-
spective of each party.
1. Tenant bankruptcy
As a general rule, a bankrupt tenant (not necessarily a farmer)
has the right to assign the lease absent a restrictive provision. 20' But
a crop-share arrangement is precisely the type of lease that the land-
lord enters in reliance on the personal characteristics of the tenant. 20 2
The share of crops that the landlord receives as rent depends on the
tenant's knowledgeable and diligent cultivation of the rented land.
For this reason, almost every state court that has directly faced the
issue has held that a crop-share lease is an unassignable personal
service contract. 20 3 As the Michigan Supreme Court in Randall v.
201 See 2 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 13, 246[1].
202 F. REISS, supra note 13, at 1, explains that picking the proper tenant is perhaps the
most important decision a farm landlord will make. He suggests that good tenants are likely
to have the following traits:
(1) honesty; (2) knowledge of how to care for all the crop and livestock enterprises to
be included in the farm business; (3) the ability and energy to do good work in
proper season; (4) sufficient equipment and financial backing to operate the farm
effectively according to the terms of the lease; (5) a favorable attitude toward the
adoption of new methods and practices as rapidly as their merit is established; (6)
interest in preventing the spread of weeds, diseases, and inspect pests; (7) pride and
interest in farm and community life; (8) a willingness to make minor repairs around
the farm; (9) a willingness to enter into cooperative planning with respect for the
specific wishes of the landlord; and (10) a willingness to keep good records and to
make timely reports to the landlord.
Id at 2.
203 See Crump v. Tolbert, 210 Ark. 920, 198 S.W.2d 518 (1946); Edison v. Babka, 111
Mich. 235, 69 N.W. 499 (1896); Lewis v. Sheldon, 103 Mich. 102, 61 N.W. 269 (1894); Ran-
dall v. Chubb, 46 Mich. 311, 9 N.W. 429 (1881); Greeson v. Byrd, 54 N.C. App. 681, 284
S.E.2d 195 (1981); Myer v. Roberts, 50 Or. 81, 89 P. 1051 (1907); Meyer v. Livesley, 45 Or.
487, 78 P. 670 (1904); Tipton v. Martzell, 21 Wash. 273, 57 P. 806 (1899). See also 4 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 865 (1951), where Corbin cites the crop-share lease as an
example of personal service contract for which the tenant has no power to delegate perform-
ance to a substitute. But.see Glanz v. Halperin, 251 Ill. App. 572 (1929).
The cases where the court did not so hold are generally distinguishable on their facts.
For example, in California Packing Corp. v. Lopez, 207 Cal. 600, .279 P. 664 (1929), the issue
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Chubb204 explained:
[T]he very nature and character of the lease or agreement
shows that it was a personal one to the defendant and could not
be assigned by him to a third party without the consent of his
lessor. The rent or share which the latter would receive, must
depend very much on the character of the lessee, and the latter
could not place a party in possession of the premises, who might
not be a good husbandman, and who might not be able to carry
on the farm operations in a good, careful, and proper manner.
Under such a lease the landlord has a right to choose his tenant,
and he may be willing to lease upon shares to one man, and yet
be wholly unwilling to let another have possession upon any
terms.
20 5
Applying this same rationale, cropper contracts might be similarly
classified as personal service contracts if circumstances indicate that
the landowner relied on the character and ability of the cropper.20 6
State law classifications of crop-share leases as nonassignable
personal service contracts generally prevent the trustee from assum-
was whether the administrator of the estate of the tenant under a crop-share lease could
assume the lease, or whether the lease called for such personal service by the tenant to render
it terminable at his death. The court reversed the verdict of the lower court, which had been
directed for the landlord. The court noted, however, the fact that the original tenant, who
had assigned the lease to the decedent with the landlord's consent, was a copartnership, was
evidence that the lease did not call for personal services of any one individual. In addition,
the court questioned whether the landlord might not be estopped from claiming that the lease
terminated at the tenant's death, because it had allowed the administrator of the tenant's
estate to remain in possession for many months. In Dworak v. Graves, 16 Neb. 706, 21 N.W.
440 (1884), the court allowed assignment when the tenant had fully raised the crops, even
though the crops had not yet been harvested. In Cupples v. Level, 54 Wash. 299, 103 P. 430
(1909), the crops had already been harvested and marketed.
204 46 Mich. 311, 9 N.W. 429 (1881).
205 Id at 429.
206 Flowers v. Mehrhoff (In re Estate of Flowers), 95 Ill. App. 3d 333, 420 N.E.2d 216
(1981), focused on whether the personal representative of the estate of a farmer who had
entered into an agreement to farm on shares could complete performance under the agree-
ment, or whether the agreement terminated at the farmer's death. The court remanded the
case to the trial court for the factual determination of the exact nature of the relationship
created by the agreement. The court held that if the trial court found that the relationship
was that of landlord-tenant, the leasehold continued because the landlord had not served the
personal representative with notice of termination as required by state statute for farm tenan-
cies from year to year. (See note 13 supra regarding that statute in Illinois.) In addition, the
court stated that if the trial court found that the agreement was a cropper contract, it would
also have to decide whether such a contract was a personal service contract that the personal
representative could not assume.
The court did not discuss the issue of whether a crop-share lease is a nonassumable per-
sonal service contract. It apparently assumed that as long as the agreement was a farm ten-
ancy from year to year, the landlord could not prevent the personal representative from
performing under the agreement without complying with the statutory notice requirement.
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ing the lease if the tenant enters bankruptcy, and neither the trustee
nor the tenant as debtor in possession will be able to assign the lease
to another farmer. In some cases, this restriction could prevent the
tenant from reorganizing successfully. Although unfortunate, that
situation must be viewed in light of the unfairness that might result if
the landlord were forced to accept performance from the trustee or
an assignee. When, as in a crop-share lease, the landlord enters the
relationship in reliance on the personal characteristics of the tenant,
the landlord should not have to accept an undesired substitute
merely because the tenant enters bankruptcy.
Because the courts in many states have not faced this specific
issue, the tenant's trustee might argue for the right to assume a crop-
share lease, relying on the general rule that absent a restrictive lease
provision, the tenant has a right to assign a lease. A landlord who
does not want to accept performance from a substitute tenant should
stress the absence of state precedent on the issue of whether a crop-
share lease is a nonassignable personal service contract and focus at-
tention on the authority in other states holding crop-share leases
nonassignable.
Although this issue is important in a theoretical sense, it may
arise rarely in practice. In all likelihood, a tenant attempting reor-
ganization will plan to assumie the lease and farm the land person-
ally. Moreover, even a trustee would probably assume the lease to
facilitate the farmer's continued use of the property. Thus, one could
argue that personal service contracts should be assumable when cir-
cumstances indicate that the original tenant will farm the property;
in this situation, the landlord's expectations would be fulfilled and
the tenant's successful reorganization furthered.
2. Landlord bankruptcy
When a landlord under a crop-share lease enters bankruptcy,
the trustee or landlord as debtor in possession may want to assume or
assign the lease. For example, the landlord may need the lease to
complete a Chapter 11 reorganization successfully, or the landlord
may have decided to reduce his holdings and hopes to assign the
lease to the purchaser of the leased premises.
The extent of a landlord's involvement in a farm operation de-
pends on the individual crop-share agreement. Under some crop-
share leases, the landlord may participate significantly in the day-to-
day operation of the farm. The landlord's regular and significant
participation in the farm's operation may be evidence that the tenant
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entered into the crop-share lease in reliance on the landlord's per-
sonal characteristics, thus supporting the conclusion that the lease is
a nonassumable contract.20 7 On the other hand, as one author has
explained, "the landlord's participation is usually limited to making
decisions about the use of land, seed, and fertilizer and to sharing in
fertilizer costs, crop expenses, and the care and maintenance of im-
provements. ' ' 20 Landlord participation to the limited extent typical
of many crop-share leases would tend to indicate that the tenant did
not rely on the landlord's personal characteristics, thus supporting
the argument that the lease is not a personal service contract.
This analysis comports with the determination of whether the
tenant can assign such a lease. Unless the landlord's participation in
the day-to-day operation of the farm affects the level of production,
the size of the tenant's crop share will not depend on the landlord
(assuming the landlord complies with the lease provisions regarding
inputs and improvements).20 9 If the landlord does not actively par-
ticipate in the farming, either the trustee or landlord as debtor in
possession should be able to assume or assign the lease. If the land-
lord does participate significantly, the debtor in possession, but not a
trustee, should be able to assume the lease, and neither should be
207 In defining what constitutes significant participation in the day-to-day operation of
the farm, a court might look to I.R.C. § 2032A regarding special use valuation of farm real
property for estate tax purposes. For real property to qualify for special use valuation under
I.R.C. § 2032A, the decedent or a member of the decedent's family must have materially
participated in the operation of a farm for five of the eight years preceding decedent's death,
retirement or disability. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1983); I.R.C.
§ 2032A(b)(4) (A) (West Supp. 1983). In addition, the heir or a member of his family must
continue to participate materially in the operation of the farm. See I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(6)(B)
(West Supp. 1983). For more information on the meaning of material participation, see
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(iii), 20.2032A-3(e)(2) (1983).
208 See F. REIss, supra note 13, at 9.
209 The same basic approach can be used in deciding whether a cropper contract is a
personal service contract that the landowner cannot assign.
The statement that the employer can assign his right to the promised service
does not mean that he can by assignment change in any material way the service to
be rendered. . . .If the service is to be rendered under the personal supervision and
direction of the employer, he can assign his right to such service; but his own readi-
ness and willingness to supervise and direct is still a condition precedent to the ser-
vant's duty to proceed with the service, just as it was prior to the assignment. In
such a case, the death of the employer, or his refusal to perform the condition of
supervision, will operate to discharge the employee from further duty.
4 A. CORBIN, supra note 203, at 438-39 (footnotes omitted). In many cropper contracts, the
landowner may have reserved the right to supervise and direct the cropper personally. The
landowner probably should not be able to assign such a contract, absent a willingness to
continue to supervise and direct the cropper personally after assignment.
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able to assign the lease.210
C. Efect of Ban .rupt on State Law Remedies For Tenant's Default
If a farm tenant defaults on his lease obligations, the landlord
may normally pursue state law remedies. For example, if an Illinois
tenant under a crop-share lease has stopped cultivating growing
crops, the landlord can proceed under the Illinois statute permitting
him to seize, cultivate, and harvest the crops. 211 Once the tenant files
a bankruptcy petition, however, the landlord can no longer bring an
action pursuant to that statute. Section 362(a)(3) provides that the
bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of any act to obtain possession
of property of or from the estate. 212 Moreover, the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition will stay any judicial proceeding against the debtor
that was initiated prior to filing.21 3
Because the automatic stay undermines state law remedies for
tenant's default, the landlord should be cognizant of the protections
available in the bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee's or debtor in
210 The answer to the question of whether a livestock-share lease is a personal service
contract that the trustee cannot assume or assign should be the same as for the crop-share
lease. Just as in the case of a landlord under a crop-share lease, the landlord under a live-
stock-share lease undoubtedly enters a lease with a particular tenant in reliance on the ten-
ant's personal characteristics, so the lease should be classified as a personal service contract
that the tenant's trustee cannot assume or assign. Whether the livestock-share lease is a per-
sonal service contract of the landlord will depend on the extent to which the landlord partici-
pates in the day-to-day supervision of the livestock operation. Many landlords under
livestock-share leases participate heavily in the day-to-day supervision of the livestock opera-
tion; if one of these landlords enters bankruptcy, his trustee should not be able to assume or
assign the lease.
The issue of whether a cash farm lease is a nonassignable personal service contract will be
difficult to resolve. On one hand, the size of the landlord's rent does not depend on the
personal characteristics of the tenant, and the landlord does not normally participate in the
management of the farm. The argument can therefore be made that the cash farm lease is
not a personal service contract from the perspective of the landlord or the tenant. Nonethe-
less, the personal characteristics and abilities of the tenant will significantly affect the hus-
bandry of the landlord's property. Farm landlords often select tenants in part on the basis of
the tenant's probable level of care for their land. Under most cash leases, such as the lease of
office space, the business of the tenant does not focus on the care of the landlord's property.
Under a cash farm lease, however, the tenant's business is the care of the landlord's farmland.
Thus, the farm landlord relies on the personal characteristics and abilities of the tenant much
more than in other cash leases. So, in many instances when a tenant under a cash farm lease
enters bankruptcy, the lease should be considered a nonassignable personal service contract.
211 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-318 (1983).
212 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1982). Seeln re Christopher Michaels Ristorante, Inc., 9 Bankr.
149 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981), where the court held that the tenant's filing of a bankruptcy
petition stayed any further attempts on the part of the landlord to terminate the tenant's
lease. See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, s-upra note 122, 365.04.
213 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982).
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possession's rights to cure lease defaults and assume the lease,214 as
well as the nondebtor's right to petition the court to order assump-
tion or rejection of the lease within a specified period of time,215 have
been described above. Alternatively, the landlord can wait until the
trustee or debtor in possession has had a reasonable time in which to
assume or reject the lease 216 and then seek relief from the automatic
stay under section 362(d), so that he can pursue state law remedies
for the tenant's default. 2 1
7
If the tenant has defaulted on the lease before bankruptcy, the
lease may have been terminated under state law before the auto-
matic stay took effect. Nonetheless, if the tenant is still in possession
of the premises at filing, the automatic stay will prevent the landlord,
at least initially, from regaining possession of the premises. 218 In
these cases, the court should not allow the trustee to cure and assume
the lease because it has been terminated, and thus is not
unexpired.2 19 Because the lease cannot be assumed, the court should
grant the landlord relief from the automatic stay so he can regain the
214 See text accompanying notes 184-91 supra.
215 See text accompanying notes 173-77 supra.
216 See cases cited in note 179 supra; see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122,
1365.03[1]. Section 108(b) provides that the trustee has up to 60 days after the order of relief
to cure any defaults. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1982). Presumably, the reasonable time that the
landlord must wait before seeking relief from the automatic stay can be less than 60 days,
because 60 days is the maximum length of time that the trustee has to cure the default, and
the court may determine that, under the circumstances, a reasonable time in which to cure
and assume the lease is less than 60 days. On the other hand, if the court determines that a
reasonable time in which to cure and assume is more than 60 days, the court has the power
under § 105(a) to allow the trustee more than 60 days to cure the default. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (1982); see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, 365.04[1].
217 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122.
218 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2), (3) (1982); Kearny Mesa Crossroads v. Acorn Invs. (In re
Acorn Invs.), 8 Bankr. 506 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); Marriott Corp. v. Chuck Wagon Bar-B-
Que (In re Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que, Inc.), 7 Bankr. 92 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980); Construction
Clearing House, Inc. v. Mulkey of Missouri, Inc. (fn re Mulkey of Missouri, Inc.) 6 BANKR.
CT. DEC. (CRR) 310 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
219 See Kearny Mesa Crossroads v. Acorn Invs. (In re Acorn Invs.), 8 Bankr. 506 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1981), where the landlord had obtained a final default judgment that terminated
the tenant's right to possession of the premises before the tenant entered bankruptcy. The
automatic stay, however, prevented the landlord from regaining possession of the premises.
The court held that the fact that the lease had been terminated meant that it was an expired
lease not subject to assumption under § 365: "It is clear that a lease which has been termi-
nated prior to the filing of a Chapter 11 petition has 'expired,' or ceased to be executory,
within the meaning of Section 365 of the Code. Such a lease is not assumable." Id. at 510.
Another recent case involved the pre-petition termination of a month-to-month tenancy.
The court decided that the debtor had no right in the premises, even though essential for a
Chapter 11 reorganization. 308 West Randolph Bldg. Venture v. Victory Pipe Craftsmen,
Inc. (In re Victory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc.), 8 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); see also Marri-
ott Corp. v. Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que (In re Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que, Inc.), 7 Bankr. 92
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premises.220 In deciding whether the lease has been terminated, the
court will look to state law221 and will usually take advantage of any
available method to avoid a lease forfeiture if the lease termination
was not completed when the debtor entered bankruptcy. 222
Even if the lease was not terminated prior to bankruptcy, sec-
tion 362(d)(1) provides that the court must grant the landlord relief
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1980); Hazen v. Hospitality Assocs., Inc. (In re Hospitality Assocs.), 6 Bankr.
778 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, 365.02.
But see Construction Clearing House, Inc. v. Mulkey of Missouri, Inc. (In re Mulkey of
Missouri, Inc.), 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 310 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980), where a state court
had issued a judgment ordering the landlord to be restored to the possession of leased prem-
ises on or before January 18, 1980. On January 11, 1980, however, the tenant filed a bank-
ruptcy petition; thus, the automatic stay prevented enforcement of the state court judgment.
The bankruptcy court rejected the argument that there was no lease in existence for the
debtor to cure and assume. The court stressed that assumption of the lease was absolutely
essential for the debtor to reorganize successfully. It held that "the nullification of the means
of enforcement of a pre-petition judgment necessarily erases the effect of the state court judg-
ment for possession," 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 311, and that the debtor could assume the
lease if it cured the default and offered the landlord adequate protection.
It seems open to question whether the court's holding in Mu/k,, that the automatic stay
nullifies the means of enforcing a state court judgment terminating a lease, effectively nullifies
the judgment itself. Equally open to question is the policy of allowing the cure and assump-
tion of terminated leases. As the court stressed in Marriott Corp. v. Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que
(In re Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que, Inc.), 7 Bankr. at 95:
There clearly must come a point in time when the parties to a lease are entitled to
legitimate expectation of finality in connection with their business dealings. It is
clearly inequitable to permit a debtor to attempt to cure and remedy a contractual
obligation that has already expired. To permit a debtor to assert rights under an
already expired lease by resort to the equitable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
would undermine confidence not only in the certitude of contracts, but in the.judi-
cial system itself. Such a result was clearly not envisioned by the framers of Section
365. That section itself clearly relates to and refers to "an unexpired lease of the
debtor;" and it clearly envisions that there be an on-going relationship between the
landlord and tenant over which the court can properly exercise its jurisdiction.
The stay should not actually nullify the means of enforcing the judgment, or the judg-
ment itself, but only conditionally prevent its enforcement. That § 362(d) permits the court,
under appropriate circumstances, to grant relief from the stay, supports this argument. Thus,
a court should not use the stay to revive a lease properly terminated prior to bankruptcy.
220 See Kearny Mesa Crossroads v. Acorn Invs. (In re Acorn Invs.), 8 Bankr. 506 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1981), where the court held that no possibility of curing and assuming a terminated
lease constituted sufficient cause to grant relief from the automatic stay under § 365(d)(1). See
also Marriott Corp. v. Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que (In re Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que, Inc.), 7
Bankr. 92 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980).
221 See Kearny Mesa Crossroads v. Acorn Invs. (In re Acorn Inves.), 8 Bankr. 506 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1981); Marriott Corp. v. Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que (In re Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que,
Inc.), 7 Bankr. 92 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980); Seidle v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Belize
Airways, Ltd.), 5 Bankr. 152 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980); Hazen v. Hospitality Assocs., Inc. (In re
Hospitality Assocs., Inc.), 6 Bankr. 778 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980).
222 See Seidle v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Belize Airways, Ltd.), 5 Bankr. 152
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980); In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 5 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); 2
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, 365.02.
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from the automatic stay if his interest in the leased property is not
adequately protected. In addition, the court must grant relief from
the stay if the tenant has no equity in the leased property and the
property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 223 In some
instances, the landlord's request for relief from the stay may cause
the tenant immediately to cure and assume the lease. In these cases,
the assurance that the tenant must offer pursuant to section 365 (b) (1)
provides the landlord with adequate protection. 224  If the tenant
under a farm lease does not cure and assume the lease after the land-
lord requests relief from the stay, the landlord has a strong argument
that he is not receiving adequate protection. For example, if a tenant
under a crop-share lease stops cultivating the crops and then enters
bankruptcy, the landlord can assert that he will not receive rent if
the crops are not cultivated and harvested; even if the tenant eventu-
ally decides to assume the lease, the harvest (and with it, the land-
lord's share) will be meager for want of proper cultivation.
In practice, whether the landlord can receive relief from the stay
depends on whether the leased property is necessary-as it will be in
many farm tenant bankrupties-to an effective reorganization. Yet,
in addition to demonstrating that the leased property is essential, the
tenant must show that he will be able to reorganize successfully. The
court in Guaranty-First Trust Co. v. Accent Associates (Zn re Accent Associ-
ates)225 explained: "The case law interpreting Section 362(d) appears
to consistently hold that there must be a reasonable possibility of an
ective reorganization within a reasonable time.1226 Thus, if the ten-
ant cannot show that the leased property is essential for a successful
reorganization, that there is a likelihood of effective reorganization
within a reasonable time, and that the tenant has equity in the leased
property, the court must grant the landlord relief from the automatic
stay. Once this relief is granted, the landlord will be free to pursue
state law remedies to recover the property.
223 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), (2) (1982). At least one court, however, has declared that a
tenant has equity in the leased property if the lease's market value is more than the agreed
rental rate. See Seidle, 5 Bankr. at 156. But in many instances a farm lease's market value will
be the same as the agreed rental rate, in part because the percentage shares of the parties to
crop-share leases are frequently regionalized. For example, in the fertile areas of central and
northern Illinois, the prevailing rent share is one-half of the crops, whereas on less productive
land in southern Illinois, the prevailing rent share is one-third. See F. REISS, supra note 13, at
17.
224 See Seidle, 5 Bankr. at 156.
225 8 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
226 Id. at 936 (emphasis in original).
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D. Assumption, Assignment, and Modication of Lease Terms
1. Power of the bankruptcy court to modify lease terms
When a party to a lease enters bankruptcy and thereafter de-
cides to assume or assign the lease pursuant to section 365, a new
issue arises: whether the debtor must assume or assign the lease
strictly according to its terms, or whether the court should allow
modification of the lease to facilitate the assumption or assign-
ment.227 As previously mentioned, if the debtor assumes a lease after
default, the debtor must offer the nondebtor party adequate assur-
ance of future performance; and, if the debtor assigns the lease, the
assignee must also offer adequate assurance of future performance,
even if the debtor has not defaulted.22 8
Significantly, the Code does not define "adequate assurance of
future performance," but instead allows a case-by-case analysis.229
Regarding protection for the nondebtor party to the lease, the House
and Senate committee reports discussed the unenforceability of ipso
facto or bankruptcy clauses under section 365(e)(1), and indicated
that courts must be sensitive to the rights of the nondebtor party to
executory contracts and unexpired leases: "If the trustee is to assume
a contract or lease, the courts will have to insure that the trustee's
performance under the contract or lease gives the other contracting
party the full benefit of his bargain. '230
Although the Code provides that the nondebtor party must re-
ceive adequate assurance of future performance, and the legislative
history clearly mandates that the nondebtor must receive the full
benefit of his bargain, neither the Code nor the legislative history
explicitly answers the question of whether the lease terms can be
modified to facilitate assumption or assignment. If a court decides
that the lease terms can be modified, it must then decide the extent
to which the terms can be modified without depriving the nondebtor
party of the full benefit of his bargain.
In the case of In re Pin Oaks Apartments,2 31 the court refused to
allow the debtor to modify a lease to facilitate assumption. In Pin
Oaks, the debtor tenant had leased a large apartment complex. The
227 See Simpson, Leases and the Banknupty Code, 38 Bus. LAW. 61 (1982), for a thorough
discussion of this issue.
228 See text accompanying notes 184-91 supra.
229 See text accompanying notes 192-200 supra.
230 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 348, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6304-05; see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5845.
231 7 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980).
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lease agreement prohibited subleasing without the landlord's written
consent and included a percentage rental provision. The tenant
wanted to assume the lease, sublet the complex, replace the percent-
age rental provision with a fixed annual rent, and make several other
minor changes in the lease. Reasoning that Congress had expressly
included the power to abrogate contractual rights between a debtor
and nondebtor only with regard to anti-assignment and ipso facto
clauses, the court construed the failure to articulate additional rights
to modify or ignore provisions in existing leases as congressional in-
tent to deny these rights.2 32 Thus, the court refused to allow the ten-
ant's trustee to modify the lease, holding that "[g]eneral principles of
law in connection with executory contracts in bankruptcy proceed-
ings require a trustee assuming a lease to assume all the terms and
conditions therein." 233
Another decision, however, rejected the Pin Oaks rationale. In
the case of In re UL. Radio Corp. ,234 the bankrupt tenant had been
operating the leasehold as a television sales and service store. The
lease restricted the tenant's use of the leased premises to television
service and electrical appliance sales. The tenant proposed to assume
the lease and assign it for use as a small bistro, but the landlord ob-
jected to the proposed assignment on the grounds that it violated the
use clause. After examining the requirements of adequate assurance,
the legislative history of section 365, and the Pin Oaks decision,235 the
court concluded that adequate assurance of future performance does
not require an assignee to comply literally with every lease term.
Thus, a court could permit deviations from strict enforcement of any
lease provision, including a use clause.23 6 The U.L. Radio court then
232 Id. at 367.
233 Id. at 370.
234 19 Bankr. 537 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
235 The court noted that the view of the Pin Oaks court (that if Congress had intended to
give the court or the trustee the power to modify the contract, it would have done so ex-
pressly) frustrates the express policy of Congress favoring assignment. The court explained:
Under the Pin Oaks reasoning, lessors could employ very specific use clauses to pre-
vent assignment and thus circumvent the Code. Section 365(), in broad language,
empowers the Court to authorize assignment of an unexpired lease and invalidate
any lease provision which would terminate or modify the lease because of the assign-
ment of that lease. . . . Any lease provision, not merely one entitled "anti-assign-
ment clause," would he subject to the court's scrutiny regarding its anti-assignment
effect. The court could render unenforceable any provision whose sole effect is to
restrict assignment, "as contrary to the policy of [subsection (0(3)]."
d. at 543 (citations omitted).
236 The court explained:
Section 365 expresses a clear Congressional policy favoring assumption and as-
signment. Such a policy will insure that potential valuable assets will not be lost by
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found that the landlord would not suffer any actual and substantial
detriment from the requested change in use, primarily because the
building in which the unexpired leasehold was located already con-
tained a restaurant, a laundry, and a liquor store.
Several authors have concurred that debtors should be allowed
to modify lease terms to facilitate assumption or assignment as long
as the nondebtor parties receive adequate assurance of future per-
formance. 237 Thus, adequate assurance is viewed as a substitute for
strict adherence to all the lease terms.238 Both congressional policy
and the importance of modification to debtors' reorganization sup-
port this argument. Nonetheless, courts that allow such modifica-
tions should ensure that the assurance of future performance gives
the nondebtor the full benefit of his bargain.
2. Termination and assumption of farm tenancies from year to
year
A substantial number of farm leases are tenancies from year to
year. Moreover, the unique nature of a tenancy from year to year-
continuation from one year to the next, absent proper termination-
raises special issues in the bankruptcy situation. The basic character-
istics of these tenancies have already been discussed, along with state
statutes that require timely notice to terminate them.239 In Illinois,
for example, the notice period is four months. 240 The typical lease
year in Illinois begins on March 1, so to terminate the lease either
party must give written notice before November 1 of the preceding
year. If the year-to-year tenant enters bankruptcy prior to November
1, the court faces several questions regarding the effect of the bank-
ruptcy on the tenancy.24'
a debtor who is reorganizing his affairs or liquidating assets for distribution to credi-
tors. This policy parallels case law which disfavors forfeiture. . . . To prevent an
assignment of an unexpired lease by demanding strict enforcement of a use clause,
and thereby contradict clear Congressional policy, a landlord or lessor must show
that actual and substantial detriment would be incurred by him if the deviation in
use was permitted.
Id. at 544 (citations omitted).
237 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, 365.04[1]; Simpson, supra note 227,
at 75.
238 Simpson, supra note 227, at 75.
239 See note 13 supra.
240 See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 9-206 (1983).
241 Farmers tend to enter bankruptcy in the spring before planting, in part because of the
tendency to file for bankruptcy only after exhausting all hope of receiving financing for an-
other year.
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a. Termination
The court must determine whether the automatic stay under
section 362 prevents the landlord from giving effective written notice
of termination before the November deadline. 242 Because section
362(a)(3) provides that the filing of the petition operates as a stay of
any act to obtain possession of property of or from the estate, the
landlord may be prevented from giving effective written notice of
termination until he receives relief from the stay pursuant to section
362(d). If the tenant enters bankruptcy just before November 1, the
landlord may not have time to obtain relief from the automatic stay
before the deadline. The landlord should give written notice of ter-
mination, however, even if he is sure that the court will not have time
to grant relief from the automatic stay. If relief from the stay is
granted, the landlord should assert that the notice of termination was
made effective by the granting of relief.243
In seeking the stay, the landlord therefore faces a dilemma: he
cannot argue that relief is appropriate under state law244 because the
tenancy cannot be terminated under state law until written notice of
termination is given. But the landlord may claim that relief from the
stay is appropriate under section 362(d)(1) because he does not have
adequate protection for his interest in the leased land. The landlord
can assert his need to know whether he can terminate the tenancy
242 If the court classifies a contract to farm on shares as a cropper contract instead of as a
farm tenancy from year to year, the cropper is not entitled to the termination notice required
by statute for tenancies from year to year. See Flowers v. Mehrhoff (In re Estate of Flowers),
95 Ill. App. 3d 333, 420 N.E.2d 216 (1981); Gibbons v. Huntsinger, 105 Mont. 562, 74 P.2d
443 (1937); Clark v. Harry, 182 Va. 410, 29 S.E.2d 231 (1944). If the cropper and the land-
owner entered into a cropper contract for one year, the landowner should be able to inform
the cropper at any time (either before or after the cropper enters bankruptcy) that he does not
want the cropper to farm his land for another year. Because § 362(a)(3) operates as a stay of
any act to obtainpossession of propertyjfom the debtor's estate, and the cropper is not strictly
speaking "in possession of" the land that he farms, the stay, at least in theory, should not
affect the landowner's right to discontinue the relationship.
243 Compare Original Sixteen To One Mine, Inc. v. Sixteen To One Mining Corp. (In re
Sixteen to One Mining Corp.), 9 Bankr. 636 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981), where the court held that
§ 362(a)(3) does not stay the giving of notices of default.
A landlord is entitled to put a lessee on notice of where and when the lessee is failing
in performance. Otherwise there may be no knowledge of the default which the
landlord expects to be cured in the event of assumption of the lease. The giving of a
notice in January 1980 that there was a default and describing it is only valid for
what it is-notice. The landlord cannot obtain possession without an order of the
Court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), or by abandonment, rejection of the lease or
stipulation.
Id. at 638.
244 See text accompanying notes 211-26 supra.
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and seek a different tenant, and his need for time to find a capable
tenant who will provide a crop-share from a good harvest. This ar-
gument may convince the court to lift the stay, unless the tenant
offers to continue the tenancy, a situation that might adequately pro-
tect the landlord's interest. Thus, the court must decide whether to
lift the stay and enable the landlord to terminate the tenancy, or to
allow the tenant as debtor in possession to continue the tenancy.
Generally, a landlord can terminate a farm tenancy from year
to year for any reason, so long as he complies with the statutory no-
tice requirement. But in many year-to-year farm tenancies, the land-
lord-tenant relationship is long standing and mutually profitable.
Relying on this successful relationship and having no expectation of
termination, the tenant may have invested in improvements on the
rented land, such as modifications to farm buildings, drainage sys-
tems, or carryover fertilizer. The landlord may not have mentioned,
or even considered, terminating the tenancy until after the tenant
entered bankruptcy. Under these circumstances, and especially
when the leased property is essential for the tenant's successful reor-
ganization, the court should allow the tenancy to continue despite
the landlord's desire to terminate. Indeed, the Code's invalidation of
ipso facto clauses, which usually articulate the landlord's intention to
terminate the lease at bankruptcy, supports this conclusion.
b. Assumption
Under the laws of most states, a tenancy from year to year is
inferred from the situation in which occupation of property is per-
mitted, yearly rent is reserved, and either party can terminate the
relationship after the required notice.2 45 Therefore, the tenant
should be able to assume an unexpired year-to-year tenancy under
section 365, just as he could assume an unexpired written lease. But
at times a court is confronted with the troublesome question of
whether the tenant should be able to assume the tenancy for another
year in spite of the landlord's desire to exercise his lawful right to
terminate. The court's power to allow the tenant to modify a lease to
facilitate assumption has been discussed previously.2 46 Yet allowing
a tenant to assume a year-to-year farm tenancy contrary to the land-
lord's wishes has a far greater impact on the landlord's rights than
allowing the tenant to modify the lease to facilitate its assumption.
Through judicious use of its equity powers, the court may be
245 See 2 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 13, 254.
246 See text accompanying notes 227-38 supra.
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able to allow the tenant to assume the tenancy in this situation.
Bankruptcy courts have the power under section 105(a) to issue any
order necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the
Code.247 For example, section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act had specif-
ically provided that an express covenant to terminate the lease upon
the bankruptcy of a party was enforceable.2 4 But in Queens Boulevard
Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum ,249 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that a bankruptcy court could exercise its
equitable powers to deny enforcement of a bankruptcy termination
clause when continuation of the lease would not injure the landlord
and termination would make an otherwise promising reorganization
impossible. In Helgesen v. Hough Manufacturing Corp. (In re Hough Manu-
facturing Corp.),250 the court listed the five factors that the Queens
Boulevard court and others have considered when permitting a bank-
ruptcy court to deny enforcement of such a clause:
(1) a termination of the lease would terminate the business of the
defendant;
(2) a public interest in the business of the defendant would be
lost;
(3) a public investment in the stock of the defendant would be
lost;
(4) a termination of the lease would not save the landlord from
any injury but only provide him the opportunity to obtain a
higher rent or to acquire improvements or fixtures and equip-
ment of the defendant;
(5) a history of prompt rental payment by the defendant and a
large security deposit held by the landlord to secure defendant's
obligations under the lease suggest unfairness to the lessee if the
lease is terminated.2 51
Thus, in certain instances bankruptcy courts can exercise their equi-
table powers to deny enforcement of lease provisions otherwise en-
forceable under state and bankruptcy laws.
The tenant who wants to prevent termination can assert that if
the court has the equitable power to deny enforcement of a clause
specifically enforceable under the bankruptcy laws, it also has the
247 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982); see also Simpson, supra note 227, at 89.
248 See 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1976) (repealed 1979).
249 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974);see also In re D. H. Overmeyer Co., 510 F.2d 329, 332 (2d
Cir. 1975); Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. (In re Fon-
tainebleau Hotel Corp.), 515 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1975); Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741,
744 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857, 862
(3d Cir. 1964).
250 1 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1979).
251 Id. at 73.
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power to allow the tenant to assume the tenancy despite the land-
lord's desire to terminate. The farm tenant will usually meet several
of the Hough criteria.252 He should show that if he cannot continue
the tenancy, he will not be able to reorganize successfully. The wide
variety of federal and state laws designed to improve the financial
condition of farmers demonstrates the keen public interest in keeping
farmers in business. Moreover, allowing the landlord to terminate
the tenancy would not necessarily prevent injury to the landlord but
would only permit him to lease to another farmer, perhaps at a
higher rent.253 The tenant can also point to section 365(e)(1) of the
current Code, the provision that prohibits bankruptcy termination
clauses, as evidence of a strong congressional policy disfavoring ter-
mination of landlord-tenant relationships solely because one of the
parties entered bankruptcy.254
Thus, the tenant has a strong argument for assuming the farm
tenancy from year to year, despite the landlord's desire to terminate
the tenancy. This argument is compelling unless the landlord can
demonstrate that he had planned to terminate the tenancy before the
tenant entered bankruptcy for reasons entirely unrelated to the ten-
ant's financial difficulties, or that he would suffer actual and substan-
tial injury from the tenant's assumption of the tenancy.
IV. Damages Resulting From the Breach of Farm Leases
and Cropper Contracts
A. Code Provisions Regarding Damages
When a party to a lease enters bankruptcy and decides to reject
the lease pursuant to section 365, the debtor's rejection is treated as a
breach of the lease, and the nondebtor has an unsecured claim for
the resulting damages. 255 Section 502(b), however, limits both a
landlord's claim for damages resulting from termination of a lease
and an employee's claim resulting from termination of an employ-
ment contract. 256 But no statutory limit is placed on the tenant's
252 This reasoning assumes that the tenant is the party to a long-standing landlord-tenant
relationship that has been profitable to both parties and that the tenant has not defaulted on
any obligations under the tenancy. A tenant of short duration or one who has defaulted
would not be a good candidate for equitable relief.
253 In some instances, the tenant will be able to show that he invested in improvements on
the landlord's land in expectation that the tenancy would continue, and that the landlord
would acquire the improvements on termination of the lease.
254 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982).
255 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982).
256 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1982). Section 502(b)(8) limits damages resulting from the
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claim for damages resulting from the lease termination. Thus here,
as elsewhere, the characterization of a multi-year farming agreement
as a lease or a cropper contract will be significant.2 57
1. Landlord bankruptcy and lease rejection
The Code does contain some exceptions to these general rules.
As already noted, section 365(h) contains special provisions for cases
in which a bankrupt landlord rejects an unexpired lease.2 58 These
provisions allow the tenant to decide whether to surrender possession.
If the tenant chooses to remain in possession, he may offset damages
occurring after the rejection of the lease against the rent due for the
balance of the term.2 59 Damages resulting from the landlord's rejec-
tion of lease covenants to provide supplies before rejection of the
lease, however, will be unsecured claims under section 502.260
In some instances where the landlord rejects a crop-share lease
and the tenant elects to remain in possession, the tenant's right to
offset damages after rejection may enable him to find financing for
inputs that the landlord does not provide. On the other hand, a ten-
ant who cannot afford to purchase inputs that the landlord does not
supply may be forced to acquiesce in the landlord's rejection.2 61
termination of an employment contract to unpaid compensation and the compensation pro-
vided by the contract for one year. Section 502(b)(7) limits the landlord's claim to unpaid
rent plus the rent reserved by the lease for the greater of one year, or 15% (not to exceed three
years) of the remaining term of the lease.
257 See text accompanying notes 22-35 supra.
258 See text accompanying notes 140-45 supra.
259 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, supra note 122, 365.09. The tenant, however, does
not have a claim against the estate for any damages arising after the date of the rejection
other than the offset. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(2) (1982).
260 See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982). Examples of these damages might be the landlord's failure
to furnish seed, fertilizer, and pesticide. See Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges),
602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979), where the circumstances under which the landlord's trustee could
reject lease covenants to supply utilities and janitorial service to the landlord's office building
were at issue. The court held that the trustee could reject the covenants if, as a matter of
business judgment, rejection of the burdensome covenants might benefit the estate. Id. at 43.
Thus, the court implicitly recognized the trustee's rights to reject such covenants when the
tenant remained in possession. See also American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York
Rys. Co., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (Under certain circumstances, the landlord could reject
executory covenants, such as covenants to supply heat and electricity, when the tenant re-
mained in possession.); Krasnowiecki, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy Reform Act on Real Estate
Development and Financng, 53 AM. BANKR. LJ. 363, 371 (1979).
261 For example, if the landlord under a crop-share lease entered bankruptcy on April 1
and refused to provide half of the seed and fertilizer as required by the lease, the tenant would
quickly have to find some means of replacing these supplies. Until the landlord rejected the
lease, the tenant could not offset damages resulting from the landlord's failure to provide the
supplies against crop rental.
Another problem that may result from the application of § 365(h) to crop-share leases is
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2. Tenant bankruptcy and lease rejection
Another exception to the general rules for damages in section
502 applies when the tenant files bankruptcy. Under section
507(a)(1), the landlord has an administrative expense priority claim
for the tenant's use and occupancy of the premises from the date of
bankruptcy until the date the trustee or the tenant as debtor in pos-
session rejects the lease.262 During this interim period, the tenant is
liable for the reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the leased
premises. 263 In the absence of other evidence, reasonable value is
presumed to be the amount of rent fixed in the lease.2 64 Because
these reasonable use and occupancy payments265 are among the ac-
tual, necessary costs of preserving the estate allowable as administra-
tive expenses under section 502(b)(1)(A), the landlord can assert an
administrative priority expense claim for the payments under section
507(a) (1). 266 The landlord's claim will be valid unless the tenant can
prove that the reasonable value for the use and occupancy of the
leased land is less than the rent fixed in the lease.267
B. Ascertaining the Damages Resulting From Breach of Farm Leases
and Cropper Contracts
How the damages resulting from the breach of farm leases and
cropper contracts will be treated in bankruptcy depends to a great
extent on whether the debtor enters bankruptcy and rejects the lease
or contract before the planting, or after planting and harvesting the
crops. If, for example, the debtor enters bankruptcy and rejects a
farm lease in early spring before planting any crops, the nondebtor
party would have an unsecured claim under section 502 for the dam-
ages resulting from the breach of the lease. 268 If, on the other hand,
the determination of the rent for the balance of the lease term after the date of rejection,
against which the tenant may offset damages. This problem again raises the issue of when
rent accrues under a crop-share lease. For a discussion of this issue, see note 104 supra.
262 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982).
263 See Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168, 174 (1941);In re Schnabel, 612 F.2d 315,
317 (7th Cir. 1980); In re H & S Mfg., Inc., 13 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. E.Q.N.Y. 1981); In re
Standard Furniture Co., 3 Bankr. 527, 533 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 122, 365.03[02].
264 In re Schnabel, 612 F.2d 315, 318 (7th Cir. 1980).
265 See In re Standard Furniture Co., 3 Bankr. 527, 533 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
266 Id. at 529-30, 533; Bienenstock, supra note 130, at 25.
267 See note 104 supra, for a discussion of how rent accrues under a crop-share lease for a
§ 507(a)(1) priority claim.
268 The one major exception would be when the landlord rejected the lease and the tenant
elected to remain in possession pursuant to § 365(h). See text accompanying notes 223-25
supra .
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the debtor enters bankruptcy after planting and the crops are even-
tually harvested, the treatment of damages will depend on which
party enters bankruptcy and when that party breached the lease.2 69
The same general rules for determining the amount of the
nondebtor's damages will apply, however, regardless of when the
debtor enters bankruptcy.
Courts have generally held that when a landlord breaches a
crop-share lease by denying the tenant possession, wrongfully evict-
ing the tenant, or refusing to provide supplies thereby forcing the
tenant to abandon the leased premises, the measure of damages re-
sulting from the landlord's breach is the value of the tenant's share of
crops that would have been harvested, less the expenses avoided by
not performing under the lease.2 70 Courts have also generally ap-
plied the same measure of damages when a landowner breaches a
cropper contract, but they have held that because the cropper is the
landowner's employee, he has a duty to mitigate damages by seeking
other employment.2 71 The courts disagree on the issue of whether
the value of the labor which the tenant or cropper labor did not per-
form after breach should be subtracted from the value of the crops in
determining damages.2 72
269 See text accompanying notes 114-72 stpra. If, however, the debtor first assumed and
then defaulted on the farm lease, the nondebtor party would have an administrative expense
priority claim under § 507(a)(1) for the damages resulting from the default. See 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRuITcY, supra note 122, 365.08[1]. If a Chapter 11 or 13 debtor assumes the lease,
and thereafter converts to a Chapter 7 liquidation and rejects the lease, the lease will be
breached as of immediately before the date of conversion. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2)(B)(i)
(1982).
270 See Dopheide v. Schoeppner, 163 N.W.2d 360, 366-67 (Iowa 1968); McHargue v.
Scott, 305 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); Hawkins v. Reynolds, 467 S.W.2d 791, 796
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1971);seealso Agrinetics, Inc. v. Stob, 90 Ill. App. 3d 107, 110-11,412 N.E.2d
714, 717 (1980). This measure of damages is consistent with § 347 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, which provides:
Subject to the limitations stated in §§ 350-53, the injured party has a right to
damages based on his expectation interest as measured by
(a) the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance caused by its
failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the
breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
271 See T.L. Farrow Mercantile Co. v. Riggins, 14 Ala. App. 529, 535-36, 71 So. 963, 965-
66 (1916); Martin v. Stiers, 165 F. Supp. 163, 167 (M.D.N.C. 1958), affd, 264 F.2d 795 (4th
Cir. 1959) (applying North Carolina law); Crews v. Cortez, 102 Tex. 111, 116-17, 113 S.W.
523, 525-26 (1908); Smith v. Hamilton, 237 S.W.2d 774, 776-77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Mat-
thews v. Foster, 238 S.W. 317, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
272 Compare Matthews v. Foster, 238 S.W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)(value of farmer's
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When the tenant or cropper breaches the lease or contract and
the landlord or landowner consequently receives no crops, courts
have generally held that the measure of damages is the value of the
share of the crops that the landlord or landowner would have re-
ceived, less expenses for the supplies that the landlord or landowner
did not have to provide.2 73 The court is actually awarding the non-
breaching party his lost profits in this instance.27 4 In addition, at
least one court has awarded a landlord damages for injury to land
that was idled and became overgrown with weeds because of the
breach.275
Some courts have refused to allow the tenant lost profits in a
situation where the landlord breached the crop-share lease by refus-
ing the tenant possession, employing the rationale that the amount of
lost profits was uncertain, speculative, and conjectural.2 76 One court,
faced with the situation in which a landlord wrongfully evicted the
tenant during the second year of a five-year crop-share lease, agreed
that the tenant's measure of damages for the breach is the tenant's
lost profits; nonetheless, that court denied the tenant lost profits for
the last three years of the lease because those amounts were too
conjectural.2 77
The policy of refusing to allow a nonbreaching party lost profits
under a crop-share lease or cropper contract must be questioned.
Lost profits can usually be ascertained without undue difficulty. For
example, to determine lost profits the court can admit testimony as
to the yield and value of crops raised during the same year on similar
lands in the neighboring area 2 78 as well as expert testimony as to
probable yields and expenses.2 79 Section 352 of the Restatement (Sec-
labor should not be deducted), with McHargue v. Scott, 305 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Ky. Ct. App.
1957) (value of the labor should be deducted).
273 See Chambers v. Belmore Land & Water Co., 33 Cal. App. 78, 164 P. 404 (1917); Allen
v. Los Milinos Land Co., 25 Cal. App. 206, 143 P. 253 (1914).
274 See Meer v. Cerati, 53 Cal. App. 497, 200 P. 501 (1921); Parkinson v. Langdon, 36 Cal.
App. 80, 171 P. 710 (1918).
275 Cully v. Taylor, 62 Neb. 651, 87 N.W. 334 (1901). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 347(b) (1981), which provides that the injured party is entitled to damages
for any consequential losses. Consequential losses are defined as including "such items as
injury to person or property resulting from defective performance." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 347, comment c (1981). Thus, consequential losses should include
injury to the land that results when the land is left idle because of the breach.
276 Mullins v. Brown, 87 Ohio App. 427, 94 N.E.2d 574 (1950).
277 McHargue, 305 S.W.2d at 931.
278 ully, 62 Neb. at 655, 87 N.W. at 335.
279 Meer, 53 Cal. App. at 508, 200 P. at 506, where the court explained:
Under all the authorities, the testimony given by the experts as to the probable
yield of rice on the lands in question for the year 1919 was undoubtedly competent
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ond) of Contracts provides: "Damages are not recoverable for loss be-
yond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with
reasonable certainty. ' 28 0 But, according to comment b accompany-
ing that section:
The difficulty of proving lost profits varies greatly with the na-
ture of the transaction. . . . Furthermore, if the transaction is
more complex and extends into the future, as where the seller
agrees to furnish all of the buyer's requirements over a period of
years, proof of the loss of profits caused by the seller's breach is
more difficult. If the breach prevents the injured party from car-
rying on a well-established business, the resulting loss of profits
can often be proved with sufficient certainty. Evidence of past
performance will form the basis for a reasonable prediction as to
the future. . . .However, if the business is a new one or if it is a
speculative one that is subject to great fluctuations in volume,
costs or prices, proof will be more difficult. Nevertheless, dam-
ages may be established with reasonable certainty with the aid of
expert testimony, economic and financial data, market surveys
and analyses, business records of similar enterprises, and the
like.28 1
Thus, if the crop-share lease or cropper contract continues for
only one year, the court should not deny the non-breaching party lost
profits on the grounds that they are too conjectural. By the testi-
mony of neighboring farmers and experts, the nonbreaching party
can usually establish both the quantity of crops that would have
been produced and the value of those crops with reasonable cer-
tainty.282 When the landlord breaches a cash farm lease, the tenant
will have to introduce similar evidence to establish his lost profits
for that purpose. Indeed, the only and the very best character of evidence for the
establishment of the fact of loss of future profits in a case such as the one here must
of necessity, as a general rule, come from the testimony of experts or persons who,
from long experience in the same line of business, have acquired such a knowledge
of the results of the operations of such business as to enable them to state with at
least approximate accuracy what, in the way of profits under given conditions, the
future potentialities of the business may be. It is, of course, to be conceded that
prospective profits, as damages, are incapable of being shown with that accuracy
with which the ordinary questions of fact can be established.
280 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981).
281 Id., comment b.
282 Nevertheless, one may question the time at which the value of the crops should be
ascertained. One court has held that harvest is the correct time, Goforth v. Smith, 206 Okla.
394, 244 P.2d 304 (1952); another has focused on the time that the landlord would have
received his share, Parkinson v. Langdon, 36 Cal. App. 80, 171 P. 710 (1918). Although
harvest and delivery are usually close together, the latter time is probably preferable for ascer-
taining value, because only after delivery could the landlord in turn deliver his share to a
purchaser.
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with reasonable certainty. This evidence will consist of the value of
the crops he would have raised, less the cash rent and other expenses
he does not incur.28 3
When a crop-share lease is multi-year, however, the court may
be justified in denying lost profits for the years subsequent to the year
of breach. Realistically, though, because of the limitations of section
502(b) (7) on a landlord's claim for damages, and section 502(b)(8) on
a cropper's claim for damages,28 4 a bankruptcy court will only face
this issue when a landlord breaches a multi-year crop-share lease
before the last year of the lease. In Illinois, much farmland is rented
only for a year at a time,28 5 and the same undoubtedly holds true in
other states. Even if the tenant offers expert testimony on lost profits
for the remainder of the lease, the court may find that the evidence
does not establish the lost profits for the years after the year of the
breach with reasonable certainty. Varying weather conditions make
it impossible to determine probable crop yields under the lease and
widely fluctuating crop prices pose difficulties in predicting the value
of the crops even if the yield could be determined. Nevertheless,
damages based on crop yield and price predictions may be no more
speculative than other types of damages. And, these difficulties cer-
tainly would not prevent the court from awarding lost profits for the
year of the breach.
If the court refuses to allow the tenant lost profits for future
years when the landlord breaches a crop-share lease, the tenant may
seek the difference between the fair rental value of the leased land
and the rent provided by the lease as an alternative measure of dam-
ages.286 Two problems may render this measure of damages of little
assistance to the tenant. First, in many crop-share leases the fair
rental value of the land will be the same as the rent, so the tenant
would receive no damages. More importantly, as the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts explains:
Damages based on fair rental value include an element of profit
283 Cross v. Ramdullah, 274 F. 762, 770-71 (9th Cir.), cert. dinied, 257 U.S. 655 (1921). If
the tenant breaches a cash farm lease, the landlord's damages will depend on the cash rent
established in the lease and any injury to the land that results when the land is left idle. See
note 275 supra.
284 See note 256 supra.
285 See F. REISS, supra note 13, at 43.
286 Watson v. Lewis, 272 N.W.2d 459, 465 (Iowa 1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(1) (1981), which provides: "If a breach delays the use of property
and the loss in value to the injured party is not proved with reasonable certainty, he may
recover damages based on the rental value of the property or on interest on the value of the
property."
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since the fair rental value of property depends on what it would
command on the market and this turns on the profit that would
be derived from its use. For this reason, uncertainty as to profits
may result in uncertainty in fair rental value.28 7
Because fair rental value for a crop-share lease is based on the crop
yield, and the value of these crops and lost profits are determined
with the same factors, a court holding that the evidence does not
establish lost profits with reasonable certainty would likely conclude
that the evidence does not adequately establish fair rental value.
If the tenant cannot receive his lost profits or fair rental value,
he still has a right to damages based on his reliance interest, as do the
landlord and a landowner or cropper under a cropper contract. 288
This reliance interest includes expenditures made in preparation for
or in actual performance. 28 9 Thus, for the tenant or cropper under a
crop-share lease or cropper contract, the reliance interest would in-
clude the cost of supplies and equipment purchased in anticipation
of performance. Because of the nature of the reliance interest, how-
ever, if the tenant seeks damages for the breach of a multi-year crop-
share lease, his recovery often will not include damages for the years
after the breach because the tenant will not yet have made expendi-
tures in preparation for performance in those years.29°
The bankruptcy court will face several additional problems in
deciding how the nondebtor's claim for damages should be treated.
For example, if a crop-share tenant enters bankruptcy, state law
grants the landlord no property interest in the crops before division,
and the tenant as debtor in possession sells all the crops before divi-
sion, the landlord's claim for damages will generally amount to the
value of the share of crops he would have received, minus any ex-
penses saved. As for the portion of damages that represents rent ac-
crued before bankruptcy filing, the landlord will have only an
unsecured claim under section 502; for the portion that represents
rent after filing, the landlord will have an administrative expense pri-
287 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348, comment b (1981).
288 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981). See also Watson v. Lewis,
272 N.W.2d 459, 465 (Iowa 1978), where the court awarded the tenant his reliance interest as
damages when the landlord breached the crop-share lease.
289 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981).
290 In some instances, however, the tenant may have made expenditures in preparation
for performance in future years, and those expenditures should be included as reliance dam-
ages. For example, in the first year of a five-year lease the tenant may have purchased expen-
sive equipment, such as a corn picker or combine, in reliance on the lease. Or he may have
applied fertilizer intended for crops in growing seasons after the year of application.
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ority under section 507(a)(1).291 As previously mentioned, the court
will also have to decide how to apportion the damages between the
unsecured claim and the administrative priority claim. 292
Similarly, if the landowner under a cropper contract enters
bankruptcy and rejects the contract before harvest, and state law
grants the cropper no interest in the crops before division, the crop-
per's claim for damages generally will equal the value of the share of
the crops that he would have received, less any expenses saved. For
the portion of damages representing wages that accrued before the
landowner entered bankruptcy, the cropper will have a wage priority
claim under section 507(a)(3) for the first $2,000, and an unsecured
claim under section 502 for the rest; as for the portion of damages
representing wages that accrued between filing and rejection, the
cropper will have an administrative expense wage priority claim
under section 507(a) (1); and for the rest of the damages the cropper
will have an unsecured claim under section 502.293 Because the crop-
per's wages consist of his share of the crops, the court must apportion
the value of the crops that the cropper would have received to accu-
rately represent the wages that he accrued during the different
periods.294
The bankruptcy court will face a different issue when the land-
lord under a crop-share lease enters bankruptcy during the growing
season and rejects the lease, and the tenant subsequently elects to
yield possession. Because the tenant always has an interest in the
crops prior to division, he should still receive his share of the crops
after harvest. 295 The court will have to determine the exact size of
that share. When a landlord breaches a crop-share lease, the meas-
ure of damages is generally the value of the share of the crops that
the tenant would have received, less any expenses saved. This same
measure should be used to determine the size of the tenant's share
when the landlord rejects the lease and the tenant yields possession,
because if the tenant had completed performance, he would have
had to make those expenditures to receive his share of the crops. If
the lease is multi-year and the court awards the tenant lost profits for
the years after the breach, the tenant will have only an unsecured
claim under section 502 for these damages, because no property in-
terest in the future crops has yet come into existence.
291 See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
292 See note 104 supra.
293 See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra.
294 See note 104 supra.
295 See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra.
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V. Conclusion
The bankruptcy of a farm landlord or tenant affects the entire
farm community. Machinery, seed, and chemical dealers who have
extended credit to the debtor will be affected, as will lenders who
have advanced funds for land purchases and production costs. The
farm operator's bankruptcy may also affect other, nonagricultural
creditors with whom the farmer and his family have done business.
Among those who have done business with the debtor, the
debtor's landlord or tenant is the most likely to have enjoyed a per-
sonal, as well as financial, relationship with the debtor. Landlord
and tenant may have cooperated over a period of years to plan and
carry out long-term farm improvements. Moreover, each may have
relied in substantial measure on the other for his livelihood or invest-
ment income.
As this article has indicated, the nature of the farm lease (as well
as the alternative arrangements for farming on shares) raises a
number of specific legal issues in bankruptcy proceedings. The treat-
ment of crops and livestock, the principles governing assumption of
unexpired leases, and the damages resulting from breach of a farm
lease need special consideration in bankruptcy. This article has fo-
cused on legal issues inherent in the bankruptcy of a farm landlord or
tenant and has applied principles from the Bankruptcy Code to the
farm tenancy relationship. Because of the close relationship of land-
lord and tenant and the crucial significance of the farm lease to a
successful reorganization, it is particularly important that both par-
ties be treated equitably. It is to be hoped that an understanding of
the Code as it applies in the farm tenancy situation will further the
successful reorganization of farm debtors' businesses and encourage
the continued productive use of agricultural land.
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